Social representations of "apolitical people" among different citizenship styles of Greek youth

KATERINA KARAGEORGOU*, ANNA MADOGLOU*, DIMITRIS KALAMARAS*

*Department of Psychology Panteion University, Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT

The present study focuses on different types of political engagement (citizenship styles) among Greek youth and their perception of apolitical people. International literature provides various concepts of "apolitical" behaviour, leading us to suppose the existence of a controversy-oriented apoliticism. Certain concepts correspond to a positively perceived notion (seemingly apolitical citizens: latent engagement), while others to a negatively perceived notion (genuine passivity). Our sample consists of 83 men and 112 women aged from 19 to 35 who replied to a set of questions regarding their political engagement (interest, participation, alternative participation and political self-definition) and their perception of apoliticism (perceived traits of apolitical people, perception of apolitical behaviour and its consequences). Building on Amnå & Ekman's (2014) study, we apply multivariate cluster analysis technique on empirical data derived from our study (standardized scores of political participation and political interest) in order to investigate the extent to which their typology applies among Greek youth. The results of the analysis confirm that we have to consider four distinctive forms of political engagement corresponding to active, standby, unengaged, and disillusioned citizens. Furthermore, we notice differences between those groups and their political self-definition. Combining this analytical framework with the use of social representations theory provides a better understanding of how the concept of apoliticism is reflected among Greek youth. We find that citizenship styles represent

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Katerina Karageorgou, Department of Psychology Panteion University, Sygrou Avenue 136, 17671, Athens, Greece. E-mail: k.karageorgou@gmail.com

apolitical people in a different way: the more politically engaged groups are anchored in a negative perception of apolitical people and consequences of apolitical behavior in Greek society, while the less politically engaged groups have a more positive perception.

Political science literature suggests that in the last decades, young citizens have become particularly disillusioned with the major institutions of representative democracy, leaving them apathetic and alienated (Miller & Shanks, 1996; Dalton, 1996; Putnam, 2000; White, Bruce & Ritchie, 2000; Franklin, 2004; Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte & Nadeau, 2004; Blais & Gélineau, 2007). Russell, Fieldhouse, Purdam and Kalra (2002) suggest that reasons for not participating in electoral politics could be: disillusion (the view that it makes no difference who wins), apathy (the general lack of interest in politics), impact (the view that an individual vote will not make a difference), alienation (the view that politics is "not for young people"), knowledge (not knowing enough about politics to cast a vote), and inconvenience (the belief that voting is too time consuming).

Stoker (2006) provides a more complete overview. He presents six explanations for political disenchantment: a pair of explanations locates the problem with the politicians because of their behaviour and their incompetence; a second pair discusses the changing nature of citizens as they are more critical or more individualistic and fragmented; the third explores the role of environment in democratic politics: globalization and technological challenges made people believe that politicians and politics are not able to deliver any real opportunities for collective choice.

Examining voting behaviour and electoral turnout, several scholars have reported that turnout in general elections across Europe and the US is in decline (Topf, 1995a; Dalton, 1996; Blondel, Sinnot & Svensson 1998; Jacobson, 2001; Patterson, 2003; Franklin, 2004; Fieldhouse, Tranmer & Russell, 2007; Stoker, 2010). Voter turnout in Greek national elections is significant. In September 2015, 44,1% of Greeks who were eligible to vote did not go to the polls – it was a historic low in terms of turnout. Abstention rates in Greek elections have been increasing in the past eight years from 25,9% in 2007 to 44,1% in 2015 (Elaphros, 2015). We should mention that voting in Greece is mandatory by law, however the sanctions provided for in law are rarely enforced.

While low electoral turnout might be the most tangible evidence of a crisis in democracy, it is only one aspect of any such crisis (Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995). A particular cause for concern is that young people are less likely to participate than older voters (Topf, 1995b; Franklin, 1996; Blais, 2000; Whiteley, Clarke & Sanders, 2001; Wattenberg, 2002). Some researchers reason that a lack of interest in voting is a life-cycle effect. Denver (2003) argues that as individuals grow older and their stake in society increases, they are increasingly likely to perceive the importance of elections.

Low levels of political efficacy and trust have also been found to be significant predictors for young people's political disengagement. According to Clarke and Acock (1989), political efficacy is *"the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have an impact on political process"* (p. 551). Russell et al. (2002) emphasize also young people's sense of powerlessness in the electoral process; they do not feel that there are meaningful opportunities for them to influence the political scene. Another indicator of political disengagement is associated with the increasingly low membership levels of political parties as a result of their disappointing democratic performance (Webb, 2009).

Hay and Stoker (2009) have detected the development of an anti-political culture of disenchantment, even a hatred of politics, within the citizenry. According to this view, citizens have not stopped caring, but are developing increasingly negative feelings towards politics (Hay & Stoker, 2009; Rancière, 2006; Stoker, 2010) as they see political elites defending themselves from critiques and offloading political responsibility to unelected managers and professionals that now dominate the depoliticized arenas.

In this context, the term "apolitical" is frequently used in everyday life but its meaning is far from clear. Social Representations Theory (Moscovici, 1961/1976) helps us to reduce the ambiguity of the term, as it provides a better understanding of how the concept of apoliticism is reflected among Greek youth and how it is related with their citizenship styles and their political self-definition.

The fundamental aim of social representations is to *"make the unfamiliar familiar"* (Moscovici, 1984, p. 24). They are modes of thought formed through social subjects' interactive experiences, for the control of the surrounding environment in which they act and communicate (Jodelet, 1984). This theory indicates that representational thought for an object presupposes a content constructed through the processes of *objectification* and *anchoring* (Moscovici, 1961/1976). Social individuals objectify the representational object via choices, simplifications, and deformations, based on the value system of their group affiliations.

Through the following process of anchoring, the object is integrated in individuals' preexisting system of categories, meanings, beliefs, values, norms and interests. More precisely, anchoring is a process of drawing a new, troubling phenomenon into an old, familiar system of categories (Moscovici, 1984). There is also the meaning-making function of anchoring that concerns *"the interdependence between the elements of representation by a principle of signification and the cultural and social values to which the subject adheres"* (Jodelet, 2008, p. 426).

Both functions underline the crucial role that identity plays to social representations and explain why particular people have particular representations and ignore others. Some researchers point out that social representations and social identity appear to define each other (Wagner & Hayes, 2005), while others refer to the fact that the two phenomena are always in mutual exchange (Brewer, 2001; Duveen, 2001; Breakwell 2001). Breakwell (2015) argues that social representations have a fundamental role to play in creating and sustaining identities as they provide both the raw material from which identity is crafted and the medium through which it is expressed, respectively. Through this procedure social representations translate the physical reality into the social reality in which all identities reside.

Furthermore, Breakwell considers identity as a co-production between the individual and the social context, whereas *"the individual is seen neither as the slave of social construction nor as the dictator of identity construction"* (2015, p. 251). Consequently she suggests thinking about identity holistically avoiding the distinction between social and personal identity. However, she supports a distinction between personal and social representations. This means that the personal representation is not a complete reproduction of the social representation, but *"partial and selective"* (2015, p. 260). In other words, the individual will prefer to adopt aspects of the social representation that fit the expectations of the identity principles.

Howarth (2014) demonstrates how social representations theory can give a more profound analysis of the politics of the everyday by highlighting the inter-relationship between representations, identity and ideology. Without ignoring the importance of identity in understanding how people represent their world, she further explains that *"ideology exists as an 'always-possible' influence on the construction and distribution of these representations"* (Howarth, 2014, p. 42). Following her theoretical path, we consider that we should investigate a possible inter-relationship between representations of apolitical people and citizenship styles by taking into account their political self-definition (political status and political orientation).

International literature provides various concepts of 'apolitical' behaviour, leading us to suppose the existence of a controversy-oriented apoliticism. Certain concepts correspond to a positively perceived notion (seemingly apolitical citizens: latent engagement), while others to a negatively perceived notion (genuine passivity). For example, Norris' (2002, 2011) thesis, known also as the 'critical citizens' thesis, describes an electorate that is more difficult to please than their parents' or grandparents' generations and "more ready" to display their dissatisfaction through either electoral non-participation or alternative channels of political protest. Norris argues that critical citizens are generally found among the younger cohorts of voters and tend to be better educated and better informed politically.

Schudson's "monitorial citizens" (Schudson 1996, 1998) are not politically passive, even if they do not formally participate in politics. Schudson argues that their low level of formal political participation reflects rational decision-making. "Monitorial citizens" will act only when they feel the need to intervene –but, until then, they stay out of politics. In addition, Dalton's (2013) typology contains four groups that represent distinct mobilisation patterns. We find among them the "apolitical independents" (who lack both party cues and cognitive skills), and the "apartisans" (who lack party ties but score high on the cognitive mobilisation dimensions).

Finally, Amna and Ekman (2014) go beyond the simplistic division between active and passive citizens. They suggest three distinctive forms of "political passivity". They argue that political passivity is not a unidimensional phenomenon but it encompasses two kinds of genuinely passive people, unengaged as well as disillusioned citizens, and a third kind of seemingly passive citizens who are prepared for political action, should circumstances warrant. Such "stand-by" citizens are those who stay alert, keep themselves informed about politics by bringing up political issues in everyday life contexts, and are willing and able to participate if needed (potential political participants). More precisely, by keeping political interest conceptually separate from participation, authors suggest a qualified characterization of actual citizenship styles based on different combinations of interest and participation. Hence, they describe four groups: active (high interest and highest participation), stand-by (highest interest and average participation), unengaged (low interest and low participation) and disillusioned citizens (low participation and lowest on interest).

In this study, we want to investigate the extent to which Amna and Ekmna's (2014) typology of citizenship styles applies among Greek youth. Moreover, we enquire whether

citizenship groups differ in other meaningful ways, such as alternative political participation, political self-definition, and mostly in their perception of apolitical people and consequences of apolitical behaviour in Greek society. Do these citizenship groups perceive the apolitical position as an act of political consciousness?

We hypothesize that the more political engaged citizens (active and stand-by) would have a negative perception of apolitical behavior and its consequences in Greek society, while the less political engaged (unengaged and disillusioned) would have a positive perception of apolitical behavior and its consequences in Greek society.

METHOD

Amna and Ekman (2014) use youth participation and interest to identify different citizenship orientations. More precisely, they use two questions to measure political interest ("How interested are you in politics?", "How interested are you in societal issues?") and a list of 11 activities to measure political participation (such as "Collected signatures", "Distributed leaflets with a political content", "Contacted a politician or public official", "Boycotted or bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons", "Worn a badge or a t-shirt with a political message", "Participated in a legal demonstration or strike" and so forth). We adopt their internal logic, although we consider that we should broaden the questions that we will use as measures. We also expect that Amna and Ekman's citizenship styles would contribute to a further understanding of the representational process, as they provide us with a clearer view of participants' identities. We consider that political self-definition refers to participants' subjective perception of their political position, while citizenship style derives from different combinations between participants' political interest and political participation, which establish less subjective criteria.

In addition, based on the results of the thematic analysis on 28 semi-structured interviews, we identified a crucial distinction focused on two opposite perceptions of apolitical people. The first considers apoliticism as a form of apathy (negative representation) and the second as an act of protest (positive representation). Furthermore, we found that the more politically oriented participants have a negative representation of apolitical people, while the less politically oriented have a positive one. Although we acknowledge that this bipolar scheme is to some extent simplistic and that further investigation may provide us with extra information regarding the organizational content of the term, we consider that its use will facilitate our access to a larger sample. Consequently, the data that we collected from our

qualitative research led us to the construction of our questionnaire, which will be described below. Note that the bipolar distinction of apoliticism (traits of apolitical people, apolitical behaviour and its consequences) is central and always present in this study.

Participants

One hundred ninety-five (N=195) questionnaires were collected in December 2014 in Attica (Greece). Our sample consisted of 83 men and 112 women between 19 and 35 years old with a mean age 29.77 year (median=30, Std. dev=4.14).

Almost all participants were born in Greece (N=192). The majority was single or in a relationship without being married (N=144), while 25.7% was married/divorced or widowed (N=50). In terms of education, most participants had a secondary education degree (N=63), several respondents completed technical education after secondary education (N=45) and an equivalent number held a bachelor's degree (N=52). Some participants had a master's degree (N=29), while a very small number had completed only primary education (N=4).

Material and Procedure

Participants were approached individually by researcher and were asked to reply to a set of questions.

- Political Interest

Youth interest in politics was measured as the mean score of 6 responses (Cronbach's alpha =0.627). Specifically, participants were asked if they agree or disagree with statements such as: "Politics is not my business", "Citizens' obligation is to be informed about politics", "It is necessary to be informed about what is going on in our country", "Political information does not guarantee sound choices", "The lack of political information leads to extreme behaviour", and "I do not have the time to be concerned about politics". Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.

- Political Participation

To measure participation in political activities we used the mean of 7 responses (Cronbach's alpha = 0.671). We asked "How important are the following activities to you?" and then we presented the following items: "Taking part in political parties and organizations to highlight social issues", "Avoiding to take sides in issues that I am not interested in", "Avoiding political engagement as I have no power to influence social policy", "Trying actively to influence on social issues", "Being capable to influence people who are well-informed on political issues", "Not being involved as everything works fine", and "Being

engaged in political issues only when I am concerned about them specifically". Participants had to reply on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

- *Alternative Political Participation*

To measure participation in alternative political activities we asked: "Have you done any of the following during the last 12 months?". The participants responded to a list of 17 activities (Cronbach's alpha =0.763): "Read political poetry/literature", "Attending a meeting dealing with political or societal issues", "Sign a memo/petition/protest", "Boycott or buy certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons", "Listen to songs with political messages", "Participate in demonstrations or occupations of public buildings" and so forth. Responses ranged from 1 (no) to 2 (yes).

- *Perceived Traits of Apolitical People*

We asked participants to indicate the age, gender, educational level, political orientation and social environment (rural-urban) of apolitical people. We asked them also to choose to what extent several personality traits describe apolitical people. For this, we used a bipolar (7-point) scale that included adjectives such as: Altruist - Individualist, Conscientious - Careless, Non-conformist - Conformist, Alert - Lazy, Well-informed - Uninformed, Thinking - Naïve, Optimistic – Pessimistic.

- *Perception of Apolitical Behaviour*

We sought to examine the perception of apolitical behavior. More precisely, we sought to examine if apolitical behaviour is considered as an act of protest or as a form of apathy. Hence, we asked "To what extent do you believe that the following statements describe apolitical people?". Participants responded to a list of 9 items (Cronbach's alpha =0.830): "They have political consciousness", "They abstain regularly from elections", "They are looking for a political identity", "Their behaviour represents a sort of resistance", "They are satisfied with politics", "They are apathetic", "They are interested in politics", "They are sensitive on societal issues", and "Their position represents a form of political act". Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.

- *Consequences of Apolitical Behaviour*

To measure consequences of apolitical behaviour in Greek society we asked "To what extent do you agree with the following seven statements?": "Apolitical behaviour is not a problem for our society", "Apolitical behaviour can lead to a change", ''Apolitical behaviour reinforces the two-party system", "Politicians can take advantage of apolitical people",

"Apolitical behaviour can lead to the creation of a political party", "Apolitical behaviour indicates uncritical acceptance of government decisions", and "Apolitical behaviour weakens political opposition". Participants had to reply on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The internal reliability was good (Cronbach's alpha =0.711).

- Political Self-definition

In terms of political self-definition, participants were asked to mark their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (far-left) to 7 (far-right). They were also asked to choose their political status on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely apolitical) to 7 (extremely politicized). Note that in both questions, number "4" corresponded to the following answers: "Neither left nor right" and "Neither apolitical nor politicized" respectively. Finally, we asked participants to write the name of the political party for which they will vote in the next general election.

RESULTS

As we mentioned above, we sought to test the existence of Amna & Ekman's typology with respect to Greek youth. Hence, the standardized scores of youth participation and interest were entered into a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward's method. The analysis produced a four-cluster solution that included four citizenship groups: *active* (high interest and high participation), *standby* (average interest and average participation), *unengaged* (low interest and low participation) and *disillusioned* (lowest interest and lowest on participation).

Furthermore, we evaluated the already mentioned hierarchical clustering solution by considering two statistics; the *Elbow Method* and the *Bayesian Inference Criterion* (BIC). The elbow method examines the percentage of variance explained as a function of the number (k) of clusters. One should choose such a number of clusters so that adding another cluster would not give much better modeling of the data. In our case, (see Figure 1a) for k=4 the percentage of variance explained tends to change slowly and remains less changing compared to another k. So, for our data, k=4 should be a good choice for number of clusters. However, k=5 also seems to be a potential candidate. Hence, we will consider the BIC criterion in order to decide which is the optimal cluster solution. The results of the ten different combinations of constraints for multivariate mixture models have been tested and are graphically represented in Figure 1b. The best-selected model is VII with 4 numbers of clusters and the largest BIC gathered.

[Figure 1 here]

To further validate the insights of our data patterns, we proceed with the cluster plot of the scores of the first two principal components. This approach may be particularly useful in the sense that if more than two components are needed to capture a substantial part of the variation, an alternative approach based on the use of principal components rather than the original variables must be applied. The results (see Figure 2) show that four clusters are visible, they are separated enough, and the first two components explain 64.6% of the total variation. Based on the above results and the methods mentioned before, it comes out that the optimal number of clusters choice is four, thus cluster analysis supports our citizenship typology of four distinct groups.

[Figure 2 here]

Subsequently we used the MANOVA method to examine differences across the above-mentioned citizen groups. Table 1 shows the results of the MANOVA examination on how the citizen groups differ on the criteria variables. Based on these results, we argue that citizens in the active group reported the highest levels of participation and interest; stand-byers differed clearly from active, unengaged and disillusioned groups; disillusioned reported the lowest levels of political engagement. Stand-byers presented also higher interest and higher participation in comparison to unengaged and disillusioned citizens but lower levels than active. In other words, the four groups differ in meaningful ways on the criteria variables.

[Table 1 here]

Concerning political status (see Table 2), 42% of unengaged citizens identified themselves as "neither apolitical nor politicized", 40% as "politicized" and only 18% as "apolitical". Half of the disillusioned citizens described themselves as "apolitical" and 38.9% as "neither apolitical nor politicized". A clear majority (85.4%) of active citizens identified as politicized and a high percentage (60%) of stand-byers did the same. Note that Chi-square test indicated significant differences in political status between the four citizenship groups.

[Table 2 here]

In terms of political orientation, 52% of unengaged and 72% of disillusioned citizens positioned as "neither left nor right" (see Table 3). In addition, 75% of active citizens and 57.3% of stand-byers adopted a left-wing ideology. Differences in political orientation between the four citizenship groups proved to be statistically significant. Concerning voting intention, we found no significant differences between the four citizenship groups, according to Pearson's chi-square test.

[Table 3 here]

Regarding alternative political participation (see Table 4), stand-byers reported higher level of alternative political participation than unengaged and disillusioned, but lower level than active. Note that mean differences between groups are significant, at 5%.

Although stand-by citizens perceive apolitical behaviour as a less of apolitical act, compared to unengaged and mostly with the disillusioned citizens, the mean differences between the above-mentioned groups are not statistically significant (see Table 4). On the contrary, mean difference between active and stand-byers is significant. Indeed, stand-byers perceive apolitical behaviour as a political act 8.610 times more than active citizens.

The consequences of apolitical behaviour in Greek society are perceived more negatively among active citizens compared to unengaged and mostly to disillusioned citizens. Indeed, mean differences for the above-mentioned groups (-7.121, and -14.101 respectively) are statistically significant. On the contrary, there is no statistically significant difference between active and stand-by citizens groups (see Table 4).

[Table 4 here]

We used Pearson's Chi Square test in order to investigate the relationship between perceived traits of apolitical people and citizenship groups. Results are summarized in a multiple crosstab table (see Table 5) where columns represent group responses and rows represent responses within each trait-category (note that the last column of Table 5 corresponds to chi square values, degrees of freedom, and the p value for each trait). We found significant differences between groups.

[Table 5 here]

More precisely, disillusioned citizens scored almost exclusively in positive traits of apolitical people, unengaged scored also in those traits but not as highly as disillusioned, and active citizens demonstrated a negative perception of apolitical people as they insisted mostly on their negative traits. Stand-byers focused on positive traits of apolitical people, although a considerable number of them highlighted the negative points as well. Finally, we did not find significant differences between groups and their perception of demographic and other characteristics of apolitical people (age, gender, education, social environment, and ideology).

DISCUSSION

In this study, we investigated the extent to which Amna & Ekman's (2014) citizenship typology applies among Greek youth and how each citizen group differs in their perception of both apolitical people and consequences of apolitical behavior in Greek society.

The analysis showed that the citizenship groups differed in meaningful, if expected, ways. Firstly, all groups presented coherent political identities: active citizens (high interest and high participation) defined themselves as politicized and left, stand-by citizens (average interest and average participation) described themselves also as politicized and left, in contrast to unengaged citizens (low interest and low participation) who self-defined as "neither apolitical nor politicized" and "neither left nor right". Finally, disillusioned (lowest interest and lowest on participation) defined themselves as apolitical and positioned as "neither left nor right".

However, citizenship styles differed partially from those that Amna & Ekman (2014) suggested. In our case, boundaries between groups were clearer: active citizens presented high interest and high participation, rather than high interest and highest participation in Amna & Ekman's study (2014). Stand-byers demonstrated average interest and average participation instead of highest interest and average participation, while disillusioned citizens showed lowest interest and lowest participation instead of lowest interest and low participation. Unengaged citizens were the only group that presented almost identical results: low interest and low participation. Contextual factors such as the financial and socio-political crisis in Greece might explain these differences. In addition, Amna & Ekman's sample consisted of middle adolescents coming from a Swedish city, and their mean age was 16.6 years. In our survey, participants were between 19 and 35 years old with a mean age 29.77 years. These age differences between samples could present another explanation for partial differences on citizenship styles.

Secondly, as we had hypothesized at the outset, representations of apoliticism are influenced by citizenship styles: the more politically engaged groups had a negative perception of apolitical behaviour and its consequences in Greek society, while the less politically engaged groups had a more positive perception. In other words, active citizens perceived apolitical behaviour as a form of apathy that reinforces the two-party system and weakens political opposition, and they represented apolitical people as apathetic and indifferent to politics, and as more likely to uncritically accept government decisions. Active citizens chose mostly negative traits, such as naïve, individualist, conformist and uninformed, in order to describe apolitical people.

Stand-by citizens perceived apolitical behaviour as a kind of political act linked with political consciousness, resistance, and sensitiveness in societal issues. However, they represented apolitical people in a more ambivalent way by choosing in high incidence both

negative and positive traits. For unengaged and disillusioned citizens, apolitical behaviour does not cause any problem in society, and it may even lead to change or to the creation of a political party. Additionally, unengaged and disillusioned citizens chose almost exclusively positive traits, such as altruist, conscious, non-conformist, alert, well-informed and thinking persons in order to represent apolitical people. To sum up, we observed that active citizens adopt a profoundly negative representation of 'apolitical people', stand-byers an ambivalent one, while unengaged and disillusioned participants adopt a clearly positive representation.

The Theory of Social Identity (Tajfel, 1974, 1979, 1981) provides further explanations. According to it, we should expect unengaged and disillusioned citizens who did not identify with any specific political status and orientation to make positive trait attributions in ways that benefit their in-groups (and consequently benefit themselves). Conversely, we should also expect active citizens to focus on negative aspects of the out-group (apolitical people) in order to enhance their own self-image. Active citizens might perceive apolitical people as a threat to their identity. These observations confirm our insistence in considering citizenship groups as separate social identities with specific political characteristics.

At the same time, the social representation approach contributes to our understanding of how apoliticism was integrated in individuals' preexisting system of meanings, beliefs, interests and social values. The process of anchoring apoliticism to an existing system of values and beliefs is highlighted when taking into account participants' citizenship styles. We can conclude that social representations of 'apolitical people' and citizenship styles constitute a feedback loop, with each one reinforcing the other. One could argue in response that participants were not aware of their citizenship style and that we should not thus use citizenship styles in the representational process. However, we consider that participants were aware of such citizenship styles, in a latent way at the very least. Citizenship styles constitute specific forms of political engagement and it is impossible for participants not to be aware of such specific engagement, at least in latent way. Our view is reinforced by the fact that all citizenship groups presented coherent political identities, as was described above.

Future research should focus on how emotions, financial vulnerability, and ideological context could impact both citizenship styles and the relevant perceptions of apoliticism. Research evidence indicates that evaluations arising from emotional processes can influence emotional expression, but also thoughts, decisions, and political behaviour (Markus, 1991, 2000). More precisely, feelings of financial vulnerability are found to impact on perception of the social order and the welfare state (Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux, 2007). Focusing

on Greek society, we should investigate not only the emotional dimension, but also contextual factors such as financial crisis or the impact of individualistic ideologies (Dumont, 1986) on the perception of apoliticism and on citizens' type of political engagement. By taking into account the aforementioned dimensions, we could draw parallels to Howarth's (2014) argument on the inter-relationship between representations, identity and ideologies.

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KATERINA KARAGEORGOU is a PhD candidate in Social Psychology at Panteion University (Athens, Greece). Her research interests focus on the application of social psychology theories (social representations, identity) to the field of political psychology.

Contact Info: Department of Psychology Panteion University, Sygrou Avenue 136, 17671, Athens, Greece. E-mail: k.karageorgou@gmail.com

ANNA MADOGLOU is a Professor of Social Psychology in the Department of Psychology at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences. She studied Psychology at the University Paris VIII (France) and specialized in Social Psychology. She continued her postgraduate study (D.E.A.) in Comparative Psychology of Cognitive Activities and Social Interactions at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. She is a Doctor of Social Psychology of the Department of Psychology of Panteion University, where she works also from 1993 up to present. Her inquiring interests are focused on the processes of social influence, in the action of minorities, in social representations and in voluntary (social memory) and involuntary (social oblivion) forms of social thought. Department of Psychology Panteion University, Sygrou Avenue 136, 17671, Athens, Greece. Tel. 0030-6976569076. E-mail: madoglou@panteion.gr

DIMITRIS KALAMARAS is Contract Lecturer of Statistics in the Department of Psychology at the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences. He holds a MSc in Applied Statistics, in the fields of Survival analysis, Demography, Social Statistics and Biostatistics. He is Doctor of Social Statistics of the Department of Sociology in Panteion University of Athens. His current research interests focus on Multivariate Data Analysis, Latent Variables, Structural Equation Models, Ordinal-Categorical data analysis, Data Mining and Big Data Analysis. Concurrently he is employed as Data Analyst (designing and

managing experiments and surveys and dealing with the initial data collection) at consulting company of Greece.

Contact Info: Department of Psychology Panteion University, Sygrou Avenue 136, 17671, Athens, Greece. Tel. 0030-6937330419. E-mail: dkalam@panteion.gr

Figure 1. Validating cluster solutions using Elbow Method (a) and Bayesian Inference Criterion (b)

| Elbow statistic for each cluster solution						
Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5	Cluster 6	Cluster 7
5,432.000	4,434.060	4,135.196	3,955.527	3,850.204	3,730.075	3,675.455
Cluster 8	Cluster 9	Cluster 10	Cluster 11	Cluster 12	Cluster 13	Cluster 14
3,544.467	3,412.611	3,399.103	3,285.107	3,218.472	3,182.332	3,147.790

*Figure 2. Four cluster solution plot using Ward's method, first two Principal Components*

Table 1. Results of a 4×2 MANOVA examining differences on measures used in the cluster analysis (z-scores)

	Active	Stand-by	Unengaged	Disillusioned	F-value (d.f.)	η^2
Interest	0.921 (0.158)a	0.358 (0.085)b	-0.358 (0.090)c	-1.583 (0.193)d	44.949 (3)***	0,414
Participation	1.319(1.136)a	0.320 (0.073)b	-0.418 (0,078)c	-1.709 (0.166)d	82.794 (3)***	0,565

* $p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$
Note: Multivariate F-test (Wilks's λ). F (6) = 47.385. $p < 0.001$. η^2 =0.428
Subscripts (a, b, c, d) in each row denote statistical significantly difference in post-hoc comparisons, using Tukey's HSD.

Table 2. Crosstabs procedure between Citizenship Groups and Political Status

		Political Status			Total
		Apolitical	Neither Apolitical nor Politicized	Politicized	
Citizenship Groups	Active	0	6	35	41
		0.0%	14.6%	85.4%	100,0%
	Stand-by	3	31	51	85
		3.5%	36.5%	60.0%	100,0%
	Unengaged	9	21	20	50
		18.0%	42.0%	40.0%	100,0%
	Disillusioned	9	7	2	18
		50.0%	38.9%	11.1%	100,0%
Total		21	65	108	194
		10,8%	33.5%	55.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test: Pearson Chi-Square=63.282(6 d.f.); P < 0.0001; 2 cells (16,7%) have expected count less than 5.

Table 3. Crosstabs procedure between Citizenship Groups and Political Orientation

		Political Orientation			Total
		Left	Neither Left Nor Right	Right	
Citizenship Groups	Active	30	3	7	40
		75.0%	7.5%	17.5%	100,0%
	Stand-by	47	23	12	82
		57.3%	28.0%	14.6%	100,0%
	Unengaged	18	26	6	50
		36.0%	52.0%	12.0%	100,0%
	Disillusioned	4	13	1	18
		22.2%	72.2%	5.6%	100,0%
Total		21	99	65	26
		10,8%	52,1%	34.2%	13.7%

Chi-Square Test: Pearson Chi-Square=27.385(6 d.f.); P < 0.0001; 2 cells (16,7%) have expected count less than 5.

Table 4. Pairwise Comparisons Citizenship Groups

Dependent Variable	(I) Citizenship Groups	(J) Citizenship Groups	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Difference	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Alternative Participation	Stand-by	Active	-3.245[*]	0.675	0.000	-5.046	-1.444
		Unengaged	2.046[*]	0.463	0.000	0.812	3.281
		Disillusioned	4.470[*]	0.782	0.000	2.385	6.555
Perception of Apolitical Behavior	Stand-by	Active	8.610[*]	2.560	0.006	1.784	15.436
		Unengaged	-3.701	1.755	0.218	-8.380	0.979
		Disillusioned	-5.173	2.964	0.496	-13.077	2.731
Perceived Traits of Apolitical People	Active	Stand-by	4.290[*]	1.606	0.049	0.008	8.572
		Unengaged	6.262[*]	1.628	0.001	1.921	10.603
		Disillusioned	9.082[*]	2.213	0.000	3.182	14.981
Perceived Consequences of Apolitical Behavior	Active	Stand-by	-4.172	1.727	0.100	-8.777	0.432
		Unengaged	-7.121[*]	1.750	0.000	-11.789	-2.454
		Disillusioned	-14.101[*]	2.379	0.000	-20.445	-7.756

. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level

Table 5. Crosstabs procedure between Personality Traits Citizenship Groups

Traits	"In your opinion, to what extent the following traits describe apolitical people?"				
	Citizenship Style				X2-values (d.f)
	Active citizens (n=41)	Stand-by citizens (n=85)	Unengaged citizens (n=51)	Disillusioned citizens: (n=18)	
Altruist	35.0%	65.9%	70.0%	94.4%	22.49(3)***
Individualist	65.0%	34.1%	30.0%	5.6%	
Conscientious	47.5%	67.9%	78.0%	83.3%	11.90(3)**
Careless	52.5%	32.1%	22.0%	16.7%	
Non-conformist	45.0%	51.8%	82.0%	77.8%	18.67(3)***
Conformist	55.0%	48.2%	18.0%	22.2%	
Alert	42.5%	64.7%	80.0%	88.9%	18.55(3)***
Lazy	57.5%	35.3%	20.0%	11.1%	
Well-informed	37.5%	58.8%	64.0%	83.3%	12.48(3)**
Uninformed	62.5%	41.2%	36.0%	16.7%	
Thinking	27.5%	65.5%	62.0%	72.2%	18.90(3)***
Naive	72.5%	34.5%	38.0%	27.8%	
Optimistic	67.5%	67.9%	46.0%	50.0%	7.95(3)*
Pessimistic	32,5%	32,1%	54,0%	50,0%	

* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001