The goal is to establish inter-dimensional links that involve social representations in the field of mental health: historicity and temporality, social and political contexts, ideas, practices and designations. In Jodelet’s words: “Social representations are in history and have a history” (Jodelet, 2015, p. 9). More specifically: “the study of representations makes it possible to capture history in the making” (Jodelet, 2015). At the same time, if naming is representing, and if the name is ontologized, such a name participates in social ontology in terms of symbol and crystallization (Moscovici, 1999). When these assumptions come into play in the psychosocial investigation of the processes for psychiatric reform, they gain weight and sense, as they enable us to discover how history, the act of naming, and social representations are intertwined. Indeed, the dispute on proper nouns within the mental health policy framework is no stranger than the classification of historical dramas or the use of analogies and metaphors such as “mental institution” and “concentration camps” (Goffman, 1981). A review of the validity of these debates seeks to relocate the analysis of its reproduction as a testimony of representations that refer to realities that continually need transformation.

Keywords: social representations, mental health, temporality, proper noun, analogies and metaphors
In Denise Jodelet’s words: “social representations are in history and have a history” (Jodelet, 2015, p. 9). More specifically, “the study of representations makes it possible to capture history in the making” (Jodelet, 2015). At the same time, if naming is representing, and if the name is ontologized, such a name participates in social ontology in terms of symbol and crystallization (Moscovici, 1999, p. 87-91). Even so, Serge Moscovici noted that proper nouns should be brought into the field of investigation, with social representations research taking into consideration the process of social differentiation. This process is at once general and historical (Moscovici, 1999, p. 84), and allows us to better capture “the intimate relationship between the social practice of naming and the separation or distinction between social groups and categories” (Moscovici, 1999, p. 92).

The dispute regarding the attribution of a name and the power of identity metaphors is a very broad field of study, as Nikos Kalampalikis demonstrated empirically and masterfully from the viewpoint of social representations (Kalampalikis, 2001). His thesis uncovered the feelings of usurpation of a cultural and historical past that arose in Greece in the ‘90s as a result of the assignment of a name that was considered proper to a new nation, the Republic of Macedonia (e.g., Kalampalikis, 2009, 2002a, 2002b). His analysis revealed in detail how the processes of differentiation between national groups and others impacted the construction of a local identity through a semantic play based on a specific vocabulary.

In the specific field of mental health, the debates surrounding the proper noun are no stranger than the categorization of historical dramas or the use of analogies and metaphors as the ones associating “mental institution” to “concentration camps” (Goffman, 1981). A review of the validity of these debates seeks to relocate the analysis of its reproduction as a testimony of representations that refer to realities that continually need transformation.

**PSYCHIATRIC REFORM, TEMPORALITY AND THE ACT OF NAMING**

The evolution of perceptions of madness (Foucault, 1979; Rosen, 1974; Pessotti, 1996) is a testament to the temporality of its forms of representation. These express, in line with the issues raised, the differentiation between practices of segregation versus practices concerning the social integration of the mentally ill. In this sense, Jodelet introduced an innovation in the study on community by delving deeper into the ways in which history, memory and representational

---

1 The English translations of the original French, Portuguese and Spanish quotations belongs to the author of this article.
actions (Moscovici, 1989, p. 25) reveal antinomic themata (Marková, 2006), whose generative dynamics note the complex pathways for inclusion-exclusion, sanity-madness, and curable-incurable (Jodelet, 1989, 1996). In fact, a diachronic reading of the various investigations conducted in *Folies et représentations sociales* would nowadays enable us to access a panoramic view of the contemporaneous psychosocial revolution of social representations surrounding madness and mental health.

In the field concerning public policies on mental health, it has been shown that adopting a term to include social integration strategies and values, promotes multiple controversies amongst social groups and sectors. It was possible to observe this in 1945, at the National Conference on Psychiatry at the Sainte-Anne Hospital Center in Paris. At this conference, the 24 governing principles of the reform movement most widely known as *sector psychiatry* were declared. In 1978, when Law 180 (also known as the *Basaglia Law*) for psychiatric reform in Italy was passed, it was the first to suggest the progressive closure of psychiatric hospitals and to oppose involuntary hospitalization. It was also possible to observe this phenomenon in 1989, within the context of the so-called *anti-asylum fight* in Brazil, when Representative Paulo Delgado submitted a bill to National Congress, which would be passed in 2001. And in 1991, when Mental Health Provincial Law 2,440 (Province of Río Negro, Argentina), which was known as the *desmanicomialización* (“deasylumization”) law, was passed, and later included in National Mental Health law 26,657, passed in 2010 (Murekian, de Paula Faleiros & Jouet, 2018). Particularly, the “deasylumization” process in Río Negro was born together with a socio-genesis of terms and concepts that gave rise to a new representational phenomenon (Murekian, 2007; Cohen & Natella, 2013). A social construct shot through with moral and strategic symbolisms that managed to ontologize a proper noun in the Moscovician sense, and whose coinage resulted from a conjunction of political-ideological, social, group and subjective factors. It is worth noting that even when the term “desinstitucionalización” [“deinstitutionalization”] was widely accepted because it was in line with the Italian precedent, the coinage of a new name stemmed from the need to differentiate the local experience in response to unavoidable identity reasons related to the recovery of the Argentinian democratic system in 1983. Moscovici (in Acosta Ávila, 2006, p. 155) noted that “language is performative”, as well as inscribed in a social occurrence: “When an institution is formed, or when a group is affirmed, it is through a proper noun that they identify themselves and impose themselves on their members” (Moscovici, 1999, p. 99). This was the case with the minority group that guided and maintained the reform, while reflecting on their designation:
[...] the ‘real reason’ to speak of deasylumization and not of deinstitutionalization was linked to the recent democracy [...] That historical moment promised to bring back institutions, which had been overthrown by the military dictatorship, and, therefore, the term ‘deinstitutionalization’ was rather unfortunate at the time, when the return to institutions symbolized the return to a state under the rule of law (Cohen & Natella, 2013, p. 116).

In this sense, Moscovici highlighted the importance of studying the links between the act of naming and social representations: “imposing a name almost automatically equals imposing a representation shared by a community” (Moscovici, 1999, p. 82). And this was so, as the act of naming crystallized the existence of a group and its distinct identity. In this sense, the act of naming is neither unambiguous nor independent from its context.

That said, the name associated with a thing is not arbitrary in the way that the word associated with a thing would be arbitrary (Moscovici, 1999, p. 84). It has been shown so in each and every process of the psychiatric reform. Moreover, as we will see later, it has been shown in specific historical circumstances, with the symbolic articulations of said reforms being important for this analysis.

THE POWER OF NAMES AND THEIR CONTEXT

If we think of more generic naming processes, i.e., processes that involve exceptional circumstances, it is surprising to note the importance gained by certain events in history, and their impact on the present, especially when human tragedy repeatedly sets at the intersection of different fields of territorial, cultural and economic policies, different fields of health, law, or others. On this point, it is worth looking at two events in history that intertwined in such a way as to show representation processes with a significant psychosocial impact.

These intersections were forewarned, for example, through events that were initially silenced, which happened in World War I and were later consolidated in World War II. These events acquired such a perturbing dimension that they forced legal, social and medical sciences to think up theories and concepts for understanding the incomprehensible immediately after the facts. It was on such bases that the international debates on dramatic events throughout history were built – events that needed to be set apart by new terms that, beyond their temporality, were also used to review medieval and colonial history. That is, they were used with regards to the physical and social elimination of national, racial, ethnic, religious and ideological groups (Stannard, 1992, 2001; Shaw, 2014; Feierstein, 2014; Pinheiro Flauzina, 2014). These events
continue to be unnerving to this day, in spite of the advances in International Law, as

Specifically, the extended and updated discussion surrounding the terms “mass killing,”
“extermination,” “genocide,” “crime against humanity” and “ethnic cleansing” (Shaw, 2014) is
a testament to the dispute regarding the blank slate noted by Winston Churchill during a radio
broadcast in 1941, when he said the events surrounding Nazism were “a crime without a name”
(Lemkin, 1946a). This nominative vacuum found an essential answer in Raphael Lemkin: the
coinage of a new term and the bases for a new case law to recognize and intervene in the face
of events of a similar severity (Lemkin, 1946b).

One might argue, in line with Moscovici (1999), that the process by which Lemkin
differentiated certain events to be taken as referents for a legal neologism that would be
transcendental for social and political life in the 20th century was the product of a double
involvement: being at once judge and party to a moral and political choice. It was his personal
and professional involvement that forced him to migrate to the United States of America as a
refugee, and it is in this context that he came up with the word “genocide.” In doing this, Lemkin
filled a void of symbolic objectification that favored the genesis and circulation of social
representations surrounding a “tensional object” (Kalampalikis & Apostolidis, 2016, p. 4).

In this regard, Moscovici noted: “When we read works dedicated to genocide, the
genocide of Jews in Germany, the genocide of Koulaks in Russia, let us not forget that each
one is inscribed in a horizon of knowledge and involves a differentiation criterion” (Moscovici,
1999, p. 86). These criteria, in modern history, have to do with social class and race. This is to
say, they take us back to the first classifications into groups that corresponded to a shared
representation of society: a representation in classes, as the author indicates.

In 1944, Lemkin (2009) expressed the need to coin a new term and to stipulate its
meanings to set out its scope:

New conceptions require new terms. By ‘genocide’, we mean the destruction of a nation or
of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its
modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin
cide (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homicide,
infanticide, etc. (Lemkin, 2009, p. 153, emphasis in original)

This process is characterized by two phases: “one, destruction of the national pattern of
the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Lemkin,
2009, p. 154). This entails an explicit differentiation between human groups with extremely serious ethical, psychological, physical, social and political consequences.

In retrospect, it would perhaps be worth asking oneself if what was yet unnamed had a representation. Maintaining that the horror lived by the victims and their painful silence could only be represented in its real dimension by themselves seems to have been suggested by the huge number of survivor and witness testimonies. Nonetheless, time and an intense work of memory and claims made before the national justice system were needed for the aggressors to be perceived as criminals by European society, as said by Jodelet with regards to the French context (Jodelet, 2017). This work restarted the debates surrounding the conflicts between “histoire historienne” (or historian history), produced by the science of history, and “histoire mémorielle” (or history contained in social memory) produced by specific groups (Jodelet, 2012). These tensions are brought back through new generations of memory and manage to penetrate into the discourse of the different fields of knowledge and of action through social representations that act as vehicles for them.

However, historical and legal conceptual borders overlap and sometimes repel each other, and leave open an immense psychological labor to be done in the face of a power that establishes and symbolizes specific terms. These terms are such that their generation in the fields of specialization of international law did not hamper their circulation and social reinterpretation in the “worlds of life” (Jodelet, 2015), where they transformed into metaphors and analogies, some of which we will consider herein.

ASYLUMS AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS

“If the metaphor consists in speaking of a thing in the terms of another, is thinking, feeling or perceiving a thing in the terms of another not a metaphor too?” (Ricœur, 2001, p. 116). This question intersects the temporality of the metaphorical construction and/or analogy between “asylums” and “concentration camps.”

Metaphors play an important role in the creation of social representations, as they introduce ideas and images that we find more familiar into others we already know (Moscovici, 2013). People use reason, but simultaneously use analogies, intuitions and metaphors to face reality when it is ambiguous (Moscovici, 2000). According to Mazzotti (2002), a metaphor is a kind of condensation of meanings produced from an analogy, which would lead to it being
considered as a condensed analogy. Because of this, metaphors are a core element in the study of social representations.

In 1961, Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman clearly set out, for the first time ever, the analogy between concentration camps, prisons and mental institutions (Goffman, 1981). In his work, he analyzed the dark areas of what he called mortifications, secondary adjustment systems and “privileges” as strategies for survival in “total institutions.” (Goffman, 1981, p. 13). To him, a “total institution” was “[…] a place of work and residence where a great number of similarly situated people, cut off from the wider community for a considerable time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (Goffman, 1981, p. 13). He defined five types of total institution according to their goals: (1) to care for people felt to be both harmless and incapable (e.g., nursing homes, homes for the blind, orphanages and shelters for the homeless); (2) to care for people felt to be incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community, albeit an unintended one (Goffman, 1981, p. 13; e.g., hospitals for infectious diseases, mental hospitals, and leprosaria); (3) to protect the community against what are felt to be intentional dangers to it, with the welfare of the people thus being sequestered as opposed to the immediate issue (e.g., concentration camps, P.O.W. camps, penitentiaries, and jails); (4) to better pursue some work-like tasks – these institutions justify themselves only on these instrumental grounds (e.g., boarding schools, ships, work camps, and large mansions); (5) as retreats from the world, or as training stations for the religious (e.g., convents, abbeys, monasteries, and other cloisters; Goffman, 1981, p. 18).

One may maintain that, by analyzing the experiences lived by people placed in total institutions and characterizing “the fundamental similarities between psychiatric hospitals, prisons and concentration camps” (Goffman, 1981, p. 219), the founder of symbolic interactionism implicitly suggested certain links between the history of historians and the memorial history of witnesses and survivors. He considered that the similarities found between their building structures and their functional organization justified the use of such analogies. Michel Foucault even stated that the institution played not only “a negative role of exclusion, but also a positive role of organization. Their practices and rules have constituted a domain of experience that has had its unity, its coherence and its role” (Foucault, 1979, p. 132).

However, there is no evident consensus regarding these analogies, as it is believed they would contribute to the loss of specificity of the historical referents they are applied to.
**Conflicts between Analogies and Metaphors**

Instead of staying silent, Primo Levi (2017, 2015a, 2015b) decided that his moral commitment was to let “everyone else” (Levi, 2017, p. 8) know about what he went through in the Lager, as “The history of extermination camps should be understood by all as a sinister sign of danger” (Levi, 2017, p. 7). In one of his works, the author described the inhabitants of the camp while expressing their representation:

> They populate my memory with their faceless presence, and if I could concentrate all the suffering of our time in one image, I would select one that is familiar to me: a careworn man with a bowed head and bent shoulders whose face and eyes do not betray even a trace of thought (Levi, 2017, p. 99).

When speaking of them, he took a moment to focus on Elias, a short, albeit very strong, man who could hardly be classified given his physical strength, cunning and insanity:

> If Elias regains his freedom, he will be confined to the fringes of human society, in a prison or a lunatic asylum. But here, in the Lager, there are no criminals or madmen: no criminals, because there is no moral law to contravene; no madmen, because we are without free will, as our every action is, in time and place, clearly the only one possible (Levi, 2017, p. 107).

This reflexive anticipation that brings together allusions to madness, prison and asylums and, even so, is resistant to analogies, leads us to the following question: what is the currently valid sense that brings them back in the social field? Some social science specialists have tried to give us an answer.

Levi uses the concept of ‘gray areas’ to refer to life in Nazi extermination camps, and specifically the lives of Jews who were forced to contribute to their own destruction, as they were forced contributors to the Nazi genocide [...] the destructive essence of Nazism that affected victims both physically and morally. Therefore, the analysis of the gray area is an analysis of the destructive and dehumanizing work of Nazism [...] (Galcerà Padilla, 2014, p. 1).

Galcerà Padilla highlights a basic aspect of Levi’s work that sets him apart from the widespread use of the concept of “gray area” in normal society. To this end, he cites the text “Che cos’è la psichiatria?” [What is psychiatry?] (Basaglia & Ongaro Basaglia, 1967) where he quotes Levi’s “If this is a man” (2017):
[...] the author asks us to imagine a man living in the conditions of the Lager to refer to psychiatric institutions, namely the Gorizia, as a social and biological lab, establishing a comparison between the alienation of the man in the Lager and in an asylum (cited by Galcerà Padilla, 2014, p. 191).

This is a common representation, and an analogy that Italian reformists agreed upon to denounce the need to dismantle asylums as places of social exclusion. Appealing to this work allowed them to advance towards this goal. Galcerà Padilla’s thesis is a testimony of this. He cites the interview of July 26, 1986, where Levi, speaking directly to Basaglia, says that the comparison to a Lager can only be sustained “as a metaphor, an allusion” (Bucciantini, 2011, p. 87; as cited by Galcerà Padilla, 2014, p. 192). Indeed, Levi considered the Lager to be an isolated case in the history of humanity.

**Processes for Psychiatric Reform: Analogies in Use**

The purpose of going back to these historical events and testimonial experiences is to reposition the debates on the processes for psychiatric reform. Therefore, it is important to know how these analogies have been expressed in the discourse of specialists and in common sense to bring attention to realities that continue to exist within certain spaces of reclusion in asylums.

In Argentina, these analogies have presented themselves in the theoretical work of specialists in the field of mental health, as well as in opinion pieces found on the Internet. Emiliano Galende², a psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and mental health specialist, referred to them in his work, “Psicoanálisis y Salud Mental” (Galende, 1990):

In this context of horror and shock in the face of sheer power, it is impossible not to make a comparison with the power in asylums: how not to draw parallels between concentration camps, the Nazi extermination of the mentally infirm, and the conditions of segregation and confinement found in asylums? How not to associate the power of repression and torture on political enemies with the devices for containment and treatment at psychiatric institutions? (Galende, 1990, p. 140-141).

In 2012, Galende once again refers to the origins of the analogy in history: “After World War II, we saw analogies drawn between asylums and concentration camps. Erving Goffman, in his study on “total institutions” allowed us to understand the reasons behind this analogy” (Galende, 2012, p. 27). The author extends this historical reference to the later development of

---

² I have María Teresa Lodieu to thank for identifying certain analogies in the work of Emiliano Galende.

medical and genetic technology, that forced us to observe “the consequences of biological positivism on the ethics of medical practices”, together with the recognition of patients as subjects of law (Galende, 2012, p. 27). Four years later, in an educational text on mental health, he maintained the same line of argumentation: “[…] the analogy of psychiatric institutions as concentration camps was too crude, too brash, not to understand that it was something else” (Galende, 2016, p. 56). In May 2017, during a journalistic interview, when answering the question “what does your specialization, community mental health, consist in?”, he went into detail regarding the political, social and cultural aspects that these analogies entailed in the recovery of a mentally ill subject “as a subject of law” (Galende, as quoted in La Capital, 2017).

Together with disciplinary production, we can find in digital media articles using the same analogy to give sense to the transformation processes of the psychiatric institutional system: “How far do asylums go? […] the Mental Health movement born in the world about 50 years ago aimed to transform the attention and disappearance of those monuments that resembled concentration camps so much” (Carpintero, Vainer, Barraco & Kazi, 2007). In December 2009, an article titled “Clínicas de concentración”, which cites “Psiquiatría y Nazismo: Historia de un Encuentro” [Psychiatry and Nazism: History of an Encounter] (Navarro, 2009), highlights how both realities intertwine through a critical view of the science involved. In an interview from 2010, Alberto Sava, co-founder of the Frente de Artistas del Borda[4] [Front of Artists of the Borda Psychiatric Hospital], when talking about how the patient’s artistic process worked in the psychiatric hospital, said:

The idea is to form them as artists so they can enter a creative process and thus learn the technique and concepts of any artistic discipline […] We think that it is in that creative process that the deasylumizing effect takes place, as, in general terms, the asylum is [like] a concentration camp […] [in that it] slowly undermines on the daily our capabilities as people, such as the ability to think, to feel (Sava, as quoted in Mecca, 2010)

In 2013, during a debate regarding the implementation of the National Mental Health Act, Sava, in his capacity as president of the Argentinian Art and Mental Health Network, once again makes use of this analogy: “Asylums are concentration camps. There is no worse place.

---

3 Big thanks to María Cristina Chardon for the reference.
4 Psychiatric hospital in the City of Buenos Aires that received different names throughout its social history. These names include: Hospital Nacional Neuropsiquiátrico de Hombres (1949) [Men’s National Neuropsychiatric Hospital], Hospital Nacional José T. Borda (1967) [José T. Borda National Hospital], and currently, Hospital Interdisciplinario Psicoasistencial José Tiburcio Borda [José Tiburcio Borda Interdisciplinary and Psychological Assistance Hospital].
A project aimed at deasylumizing will always be preferable” (Sava, as quoted in Yaccar, 2013). In 2015, on a new website, he highlights the idea of the “social transcendence of deasylumization: ‘To me, asylums are a modern concentration camp’” (0223, 2015).

That said, a report on human rights and mental health in Argentina [Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) & Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), 2007] does not include analogies like those quoted herein, nor does it mention the terms Nazism, world war, genocide, concentration camps, or extermination. It does, however, detail the shapes taken by death, abandonment, abuse, the violation of international standards regarding the human rights of “institutionalized persons,” “hospitalized persons” or “detained persons” in local psychiatric hospitals.

In Latin American countries like Mexico and Brazil, we can also find references regarding analogies between asylums and concentration camps. In 1999, Jorge Galeano Massera and Eva González Weichselbaum wrote:

After World War II, which is to say, after the mass murder of communists and socialists, Jews, gypsies and other minorities, there began the process of economic and political reconstruction, the rescue of social movements and of old ideals of Freedom, Equality and Fraternity. Once the bloodbath had passed, asylums and prisons remind us of concentration camps. New social concerns, anti-psychiatry and, in general, an anti-institutional attitude culminate in the movements of the sixties (Massera & González Weichselbaum, 1999, p. 20)

However, the text with the most evocative and testimonial power that explicitly picked up the analogy between asylums and concentration camps was the one based on the investigation conducted by Brazilian journalist Daniela Arbex (2013): “Holocausto Brasileiro. Vida, Genocidio e 60 mil mortos no maior hospicio do Brasil” (Brazilian Holocaust. Life, Genocide and 60,000 dead in the largest asylum in Brazil). In this publication, the author warned: “I dedicate this book to the millions of men, women and children who lost their lives in a concentration camp called Colonia”. The pictures included in it belongs to Luiz Alfredo, a photographer that recorded the serious humanitarian situation in the psychiatric colony of Balmaceda (Minas Gerais), 50 years before the book was published. This colony had been created in 1903, but the period between 1930 and 1980 was the time of the worst crisis. In it,
the medical criteria had given in to the criteria of discrimination and social and political discrimination. In the Foreword of the text, Brazilian journalist and documentary maker Eliane Brum once again takes up the debate surrounding the analogy:

The Report fights oblivion. It puts silence into words. It remembers. In this book, Daniela Arbex returns name, history and identity to those who, until then, had been recorded as ‘ignored as such.’ They were a nonbeing. In this narrative, they return [...] They are survivors of a holocaust [...] Words suffer with trivialization. When abused with our lack of modesty, they are robbed of meaning. Holocaust is a word like that. In general, it sounds like an exaggeration when applied to something other than a mass murder of Jews by Nazis during World War II. In this book, however, its use is correct. Terribly correct (Arbex, 2013, p. 13)

The book gave rise to a documentary that was circulated not only in Brazil, but also on websites in Peru (La República, 2016) and Mexico (Bajo Palabra, 2016). In the same way, its contents were reproduced on several websites, especially those committed to the anti-asylum fight in Brazil.

The Forum Luta Antimanicomial de Sorocaba (The Forum Anti-asylum in Sorocaba) FLAMAS, posted on December 14, 2010, an article titled: “Manicômios ou campos de concentração? (Asylums or concentration camps)” (FLAMAS, 2010). The O VERSO DO INVERSO Network (The Back of the Inverse Network), on August 26, reproduced a piece by Paula Muniz where she describes the social impact of the book on Brazilian society:

But who would think that in Brazil, a few years ago, almost recently, there was also a place similar to those camps? The difference is that the people responsible for these Nazi atrocities were and continue to be judged for it, which is not the case with Brazil. Come and see! [...] Mere years later, in the ‘80s, the Colonia was closed and reopened in 1996, renamed ‘Museum of Insanity’ (Muniz, 2016).

Journalist Renan Truffi, in a piece posted on the Internet (Truffi, 2013) reproduces long paragraphs from the book and reflects on the justification for the name given by Arbex:

‘I named it so firstly because it was a mass extermination. Secondly, because patients were also sent (to the asylum) in freight cars. When they arrived, men had their head shaved, were undressed and then given a uniform’, the author explains. Daniela was not the only one to compare the Colonia with the holocaust. At the peak of the events, in 1979, Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia visited the hospice with the intent of trying to revert what was
happening there. ‘Today I was in a Nazi concentration camp. Nowhere in the world have I experienced a tragedy like that’, he said in that regard (Truffi, 2013).

Promiscuity, rapes, hunger, unhealthy conditions, abandonment, lack of a diagnosis and medical treatment, the colony, whose capacity was for 200 patients, came to house 5000 people at once. This situation started to improve with the first actions to reform the psychiatric institutional system: “The ‘atrocities’ at the asylum only started to decrease when the psychiatric reform gained momentum in Minas Gerais in 1979 [...] Nobody was punished for the genocide” (Truffi, 2013).

In European countries, such as Spain, we found some references in books and articles on social and medical sciences. In chronological order, we can mention the sociological writings of Fernando Álvarez Uría (2007) who, citing Herbert Marcuse, details the following in a footnote:

Prisons and asylums, concentration camps and psychiatric hospitals, did not constitute a monopoly of the capitalist West; they were also the recipe used by communist regimes to face dissidents when they were not executed after being sentenced to death (Álvarez Uría, 2007, p. 132).

Once again, Álvarez Uría and Julia Varela (2009) wrote:

After World War II, the analogy between confinement in an asylum and Nazi concentration camps was too evident. Progressive psychiatrist collectives then defended in Europe and in the United States the passage from asylums to therapeutic communities. However, the institutional change only materialized in legal terms towards the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties: The Mental Act in England in 1959; the Memorandum on Sectorization in France in 1960; the Community Mental Health Centers Act in the United States in 1963, also known as the Kennedy Act (Álvarez Uría & Varela, 2009, p. 125).

Rafael Fernández López (2014) once again takes up the historical line that associates psychiatry and politics: “The asylum turned into a Republican and Franquista concentration camp” (Fernández López, 2014, p. 111). Psychiatrists Olga Villasante, Ruth Candela, Ana Conseglieri, Paloma Vázquez de la Torre, Raquel Tierno, and Rafael Huertas (2018) observe a certain analogy between the spaces for reclusion considered:

Thus, writing inside asylums has been compared to the kind of writing identified in other reclusion spaces (prison, concentration camps, etc.) (Castillo y Sierra, 2005), albeit with
the difference that it is marked by psychopathological trauma, or the suspicion of such trauma (Villasante et al., 2018, p. 5).

In 2018, Alvarez Uria returns to his analysis regarding the asylum-concentration camps analogy and goes deeper into it. In it, he analyzes the convergence and interaction of the life projects and intellectual productions of Erving Goffman, Michel Foucault, Franco and Franca Basaglia, and Robert Castel. In 1961, sociologist Erving Goffman:

[...] published in the United States one of the most impactful books in the world of western sociology in the 20th Century: Asylums [...] Curiously, it was in that same year that Michel Foucault published in France his doctoral thesis: History of Madness in the Classical Age. Foucault’s book can be read as the other side of Asylums, as, while Goffman based himself on participating observation for his analysis of psychiatric institutions, in a space and time circumscribed to his observations, Foucault at once broke with the naturalization and dehistoricization both of madness and of psychiatric institutions [...] Both books [...] played an important role, both inside and outside academic circles, to serve as support and as driver for anti-asylum movements. It is no coincidence that Asylums was translated in Italy in 1968, under the sponsorship of Franco and Franca Basaglia, or that in France, that same year in May, Goffman’s book was promoted by sociologist Robert Castel (Álvarez Uria, 2018, p. 44-45)

In Italy, Luigi Attenasio (2012), Director of the ASL Roma C Mental Health Department and National President of Democratic Psychiatry, defined asylums through different critical lenses:

Asylums: ‘moradas’ [homes] in the sense of ‘demorar’, a word and verb with Latin roots that means to delay, detain, to remain endlessly, but also ‘with an end’ to social life.

Asylums: concentration camps (‘Lagers’ were camps), spaces where sovereignty is exercised, together with a power taken from natural rights. The norm has been replaced with the ‘state of exception’ and, the law effectively suspended, whether or not atrocities take place there does not depend on human or divine right, but rather only on the level of civilization and ethical sense of the person who temporarily acts there in their capacity as ‘sovereign.’ ‘Everything there is possible,’ said Hanna Arendt. To Franco Basaglia, in the asylum, the power of the director was that of a king, like the Sun King, ‘l’état c’est moi’ (Attenasio, 2012, p. 97).
And we could well continue...

**CONCLUSIONS**

By including diverse quotes, the intent was to illustrate the history and temporality of the representational analogies considered. They were subject to debate amongst direct victims of the Holocaust, and amongst psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers, some of whom took them to be a part of memory and a banner of the fight for anti-authoritarian goals.

To paraphrase Villas Bôas (2014), an analysis of temporalities might reveal a dependence on the present ideological context in which analogies and metaphors are made, the levels of implication of the groups that uphold these analogies and metaphors, and a certain style in shared communications. Thus, an analysis of how temporalities, contexts and groups intertwined favored the identification of the ways to objectify and anchor the representations they embody. This resulted in a path to address history through the sociogenesis of new phenomena and practices, and the ways of naming them.

Therefore, in view of the arguments set forth herein, the need for a proper noun was revealed as part of an essential representation to face and understand extreme experiences, as proven by Lemkin. The contributions made towards clarification, and the call to attention on the destructive capability of the human being, committed different sciences to act and remain socially and subjectively involved with maintaining a critical memory of the events.

In line with Moscovici, identifying the processes for differentiating senses and attributions, names and practices associated with conflicts between analogies and metaphors, has revealed its anchorage and objectification here, where the tragic experiences in concentration camps and the experiences of confinement in total institutions intersect. What is worrying in both cases, with their respective specificities, is that denialism could renew the concealment of one and the other, and that gives rise to the need to pay constant attention to these events.

**REFERENCES**


NOEMI GRACIELA MUREKIAN has a Doctorate from the University of Buenos Aires, (Faculty of Psychology) and a University degree in Sociology from the Universidad del Salvador (Argentina). She is a professor in charge of the master’s module "Transversal Dimension of the Psychosocial Intervention Project: Social Representations" in the Master's in Psychosocial Intervention and Research (Maestría en Intervención e Investigación Psicosocial - MIIPS), Faculty of Psychology (National University of Córdoba) and collaborator of the project "Care, Mental Health and Construction of Intangible Assets", Department of Social Sciences (National University of Quilmes). Email: noemimurekian@gmail.com