Returning to past features of Serge Moscovici's theory to feed the future

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The aim of this paper is to give saliency to a major contribution of Serge Moscovici to a theory of knowledge. It draws on the following observation. Moscovici started out from a general conception of knowledge, insofar as he compared social representation with other forms of knowledge, science, ideology, worldview, etc. He anticipated reflections on common sense, herewith encountering the theories of knowledge that provide models for a "general epistemology" on common knowledge. After considering the climate and the context in which the classic work was published, I shall examine the contributions to a psychosociology of knowledge by emphasising three important themes that mark Moscovici's work: thinking, value, and image.

The work "Psychoanalysis, its image and public" (1961) was presented by Serge Moscovici on the occasion of his Doctorat d'Etat defence. It was for me the first, and undoubtedly the most striking, doctoral defence I ever attended. But the event was of importance: concerning many other disciplines than social psychology, it recorded the beginning of an era whose birth we celebrate here. And as in the recall of every birth, and for all celebrations, it is time to look for everything that was in actuality and in budding in what attracted so many people. With an audience from different human sciences that embodied a unity that Lagache wanted for psychology (1949), but which went beyond this discipline and which Moscovici claimed as a horizon of his approach.

Indeed, in the "preliminary remarks" of his book (op. cit. p. 8-11), Moscovici emphasises the proximity existing, beyond their obvious differences, between the sociology of knowledge, anthropology and social psychology. He speaks of "unity of concerns", of "meeting points", of "correspondence", of "similarity of goals." Bringing out the specific contributions related to the "theoretical conquests" of social psychology in the field of "social perception" and of the "cognitive processes in situations of social interaction," he sees the resources of what he then calls a "psychosociology" and its encounter with anthropology becoming apparent because of the "functional similarities" identified in the "forms of knowledge" that myths and social representations are.

To emphasise the use of the term "psychosociology" and of the power of the interdisciplinary "enrichment" with which it is invested gives evidence to Moscovici's initial intention. Namely: to do a psychosociology of knowledge. The subsequent developments that the theory of social representations has known, both from its creator and in its various continuations, lead today to consider this theory as one of the theories of the discipline "social psychology" and to interpret its potentials in this single framework. Now it emerges from reading carefully the book on psychoanalysis, edited in 1961, that the original intent was indeed to contribute to a theory of knowledge, by combining the contributions of social psychology, sociology and anthropology to address a concept and phenomena of cognitive and social nature. To measure the extent of the issue and its holistic perspective, we shall recall the intellectual and practical environment in which the work on psychoanalysis fell. In parallel with this, Moscovici, fascinated by "the very close link" between technology, art and science, devoted a systematic reflection and research to this link.

COHERENCE BETWEEN A THEORY AND ITS INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

Indeed, Moscovici also dedicated a large part of his activity to history and philosophy of science. Besides, he mentioned how his readings in this domain led him to discover the concept of representation in Father Lenoble, a historian of science, or to realise the importance of communication through the cybernetics of Wiener (Moscovici, 2003). Student of Alexandre Koyré, he followed the seminars of the latter at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, where he presented under his supervision, the very year of the publication of *Psychoanalysis*, a diploma. Work that led him to being sent by Koyré as a Fellow to the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. The diploma, published in 1967, concerned Giovanni-Battista Baliani and his correspondence with Galileo.

Baliani, this Genoese practitioner, engineer, navigator, gunner, embodied the intimate relationship between engineering and theoretical thinking and allowed to examine the relationship between experience and theory. Although non-scientist and subject to the influence of the Church, he was able to be the first to state the principle of inertia and to show that Galileo was mistaken. We can find in this character, of very concrete mind but capable of having very abstract ideas, a tutelary figure of whom Moscovici then represented as the personification of the "amateur scientist". Similarly we can see in his reflection on the popular production of the "extra-knowledge", of the "extra-resources" which precede scientific models "and enrich the lives of men" (for instance, the games of fairs which wielded electricity before it became object of scientific knowledge), an echo and a support of the reflection on common sense and its relations to scientific knowledge. In any case, the work on Baliani opened the way for the contributions on "The human history of nature" (1968) and for the other books on the relations of men and nature (1972, 1974, 2001). It allows to shed light on the relations existing between the works of history and philosophy of science or on Moscovici's ecological contributions and his approach, or rather his approaches of the representative phenomena.

This deep consistency in Moscovici's questioning is also illustrated by another realisation of his socio-anthropological intention. At the time of the defence, it was customary that a State Thesis dissertation was accompanied by a complementary thesis. On the Hat business in the Aude (1961), the latter dealt with the changes introduced in a village and professional community through the introduction of industrial production methods that involved all stakeholders of the social organisation, workers and managers "geographically and emotionally close". The theme of industrial conversion then established itself as one of the major concerns of French society. To study the transition from the handcrafted fabrication of hats, to the mechanised production of undulated plastic sheets allowed to see how social change is articulated as much with traditional ways of life than with technical developments and allowed to renew, through the comparison of production modes, the

examination of the working world and the approach of transformations: "We see the transformations as breaks, yet this is not true. In what is believed to be breaks, it is sometimes the traditional aspects of life which are reinforced "(Moscovici, 2002, p. 25).

This conclusion which meets the dynamics recorded in the phenomenon of social representation was based on an original methodology of ethnological type, 'true study of community, associated with an exploration of people's personal life'. This procedure was innovative in its time; it is joined today by a new discipline "community psychology". Going beyond the usual research techniques, a team of researchers led by Moscovici integrated itself in the daily life of the population to espouse the way in which historical evolution was affecting workers' personal lives and the social organisation.

Moscovici's readers attached little importance to this work which yet has had important repercussions in terms of formation and management of change policies. We must not forget that Moscovici was director of the department of social psychology at the Centre for Studies and Psychotechnical Research and responsible for the program of industrial reconversion at the Ministry of Work. Above all, this study opened some of the avenues which would be later developed. His ecological concerns were already budding in it, as well as his attention to communities' life which put him in line with the interest given by anthropology to case studies. By so doing he drew a line which was later to be found again by the new orientation given to social psychology as "anthropology of the contemporary world." Finally, it was on the occasion of this study that Moscovici said to have "discovered, for the first time, the importance of minorities and groups." And we know what was the fertility of this line into the approach of social knowledge.

Some commentators question the correspondence between the theory of social representations and the theory of active minorities that may have appeared incompatible for methodological reasons. But this correspondence between cognitive aspects and phenomena of influence was emphasised by Moscovici himself (1993) who showed how, the matter being scientific knowledge, minority influence potentiates the formation processes of knowledge. I shall return to this correspondence which will give later (2009) a specific role to social representations in the dynamics of the relations between minority and majority.

These recalls underscore the close cohesion and deep continuity between the different theoretical and empirical approaches that punctuate Moscovici's work. Cohesion and continuity that would encourage to open a project to raise the connections uniting his various contributions and constituting the interconnections of a prolific and multi-thematic work. Such a project would require a considerable amount of work. Allow me here to mark some of its areas by emphasising three important themes which punctuate Moscovici's line of thinking: thinking and its various forms, value and its impact on conceptualisation and meaning, image and its presence in the different ways of ideation.

THE REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE 1961 EDITION

If we stay in the single field of the phenomena of social representation, the consistency and continuity of the concerns that have crossed Moscovici's reflections and work are an invitation to pick up the thread of some directions rooted in the publication of 1961. Moscovici himself refers in different ways to the "masters" of the Sorbonne that still benefited at that time from the status of intellectual centre of university life. With the reverence of a disciple for Lagache and Koyré; with the gratitude of a discovery for Merleau-Ponty who certainly inspired his great project of a study of the representations of the body and awakened his interest for the phenomenology and search for meaning; or with the complicity of a sharing with Piaget who invited him to occupy a position in Geneva (position for which he preferred to propose the candidacy of Willem Doise).

It is in light of these different connections and of the direction towards the history of science and forms of knowledge and savoir-faire as well as towards the study of the relation of men to the social and natural world that I would now like to return to some contributions of the book on the Psychoanalysis in terms of theory of knowledge. I will use the first edition of the book in 1961, looking in comments made subsequently by its author for what throws light on the profound meaning of the initial formulations.

Several reasons argue in favour of a reference to the 1961 edition rather than to the 1976 edition. Although longer and heavier in its empirical details and of a traditional academic format, probably slightly outdated, the first edition is I believe important to consider for several reasons. The first reason being that it is this edition which is being celebrated. Then it meets the objective of building a theoretical architecture which embraces all facets of the phenomena examined and aims to consider these facets in the epistemological spaces that correspond to the state of issues emerging in the research field. We thus see appearing more clearly all which regard the discussion on the state of representations as forms of knowledge and this is thus how we can highlight the originality of the approach taken by Serge Moscovici. This state takes into account not only the modalities of the social that should be considered, but the characteristics corresponding to these modalities in the processes studied.

The originality of the perspective finds its full expression when we consider the epistemological context in which it was conceived. The interest in a psychosociology of knowledge stood out, as I pointed out elsewhere (Jodelet, 2008), with regards to a strong current of sociology of knowledge of which Moscovici pointed out the flaws due to the excessive generality of the systems proposed, to sterile controversies between declarations of intention which cared little about verification, preventing "the constitution of an integrated scientific body" (1961, p. 6). The new psychosociological perspective probably also stood out, albeit in a latent manner as the work does not provide many references in this respect, in relation to another context marked by the emergence from the 1950s of cognitive sciences and by the emergence of the philosophy of mind. This current gave rise to a "philosophical psychology" or "rational psychology" or even a "philosophy of psychology" (Fisette & Poirier, 2002) which Moscovici will discuss or on which he will draw more explicitly his inspiration in his later publications.

Another reason, major this one, to refer to the publication of 1961 regards the way the construction of the book was conceived. Two substantial parts are devoted, at the beginning and at the end of the book, to the results of approaches based on different methodologies: surveys and media analysis. The first part (230 pages) considers the image of psychoanalysis and its processes of constitution; the sources of information and the ideological interferences that inflect the understanding and assessment of psychoanalysis; the image of the social character that the psychoanalyst represents. The second part (225 pages) focused on communication, develops a model of the communication system in the media that allows to link the formation of thoughts and behaviours to the processes of information transmission and ideological expression. What is original in the book is the presence at its centre, of a part (148 pages) which brings together the conceptual analysis and theoretical inferences constituting what Moscovici calls "the outline of a theoretical analysis" of social representations. Three groups of phenomena and problems that underlie the formulation of a general model for the study of social representation are identified with great clarity: the organisation of its content and its dimensional analysis; the formation and determination; its cognitive aspects. I shall draw on this central part to illustrate my point. This part is partly re-exposed in the 1976 publication which wanted to make a book of what was a PhD dissertation, but which somewhat changed its economy.

This orientation towards a theory of knowledge is reaffirmed in the 1976 edition, although the foreword of this edition, strongly affirms the intention, with the study of the "phenomenon of social

representations" to "redefine problems and concepts of social psychology from this phenomenon, by stressing its symbolic function and its power of construction of reality" (p. 16). This ambition has since occupied the centre-stage in debates and creeds that have taken place in and about this theoretical current, sometimes forgetting the original intent that underpinned its formulation. However, in the "preliminary remarks" of the 1976 edition, social representation is defined as "a modality of specific knowledge whose function is the elaboration of behaviours and the communication between individuals." Or even as "an organised corpus of knowledge and one of the psychical activities thanks to which men render the physical and social reality intelligible, become part of a group or a daily relation of exchanges, release the powers of their imagination" (pp. 26-28).

In fact, from the moment we consider representation as an object of study, we face the problem of knowledge, as one expert of the theories of knowledge recalls: "The theorist of knowledge then wonders how the elaboration that leads to knowledge takes place, which prisms the reality went through before becoming an object for a subject who knows. He finally has to convince himself that he is essentially dealing with his representations, that there is no knowledge without the intervention of signs to interpret reality and therefore, the mechanism of production of these representations and these signs can only provide the keys to the understanding of the power of man to assimilate what is not him" (Besnier, 2005, p. 12). That is why Moscovici himself appeals to a theory "relevant to a social psychology of knowledge in general which is badly necessary, though at great pains to get crystallised" (1993, p. 344).

We can explain the emphasis given to the aspect "social psychology" rather than to the aspect "psychology of knowledge" in the current interpretations of the theory (SRT) for several reasons. First, there is the fact that the study of social representations was and continues to be conducted, jointly with the other research topics developed by Moscovici, in the disciplinary field of social psychology. This position is reinforced by the ambition that I just mentioned and recalled which renders SRT one of the alternative currents opposed to the "mainstream" of the discipline.

Also involved in this identification to social psychology is the formulation by Moscovici (1984, p. 9) of a new "psychosociological viewpoint" whose "thirdness" allows to go beyond the psychologism and individualism in the approach of psychosocial, relational and social phenomena. The triangulation "ego-alter-object" posing a social mediation in any relation to the world and completing the importance given to social communication had a decisive impact on how social representations were approached in the developments of the theory. Social interaction, interpersonal and social communications, and language have since occupied a unique position to explain the genesis and forms of representative phenomena. This tendency was reinforced by the emergence in social psychology of currents focused on the rhetorical and discursive productions. It resulted from this that the study of the aspects properly cognitive of representations or the study of the relations between the processes of representations and their contents has been neglected. Such a perspective, often considered as individualising given the works carried out in social cognition, or reductive and naturalistic given the works carried out in cognitive science, has somewhat fallen into disfavour at the expense of an oversight of the perspectives opened in the first work of Moscovici by the psychosociology of knowledge. The heuristic value of this perspectiveis most evident in the various schools dealing with social representations and in the applied fields of the theory dealing with knowledge and with places of specific knowledge as is the case for health, education, environment, etc.

It is true that the way the problem of knowledge was considered in the work of Moscovici might have raised one question. Namely, whether the fact of focusing on the transformations of one form of knowledge in another, on the transition of the theoretical knowledge of a science to knowledge of common sense, actually comes within a theory of knowledge. We are dealing with a science that speaks on a subject and a technique, namely the psyche and the analytic treatment, and its appropriation for the understanding of, and the action on, the social and human environment. But

we put ourselves in a situation where there is no need to consider an object of the life world to be known, and one passes to gain access to it through the mediation of a type of knowledge formed elsewhere than in the everyday world, mediation which redoubles the one established between the subjects. This may lead to give closer attention to the processes of communication.

Certainly, such an arrangement allowed to highlight the social factors involved in the receipt of a scientific theory and how this receipt serves as the basis for an original construction. However, somehow it invalidates the classical scheme that Piaget (1967) proposes to characterise the cognitive process and knowledge that corresponds to it: the linking of a subject and an object through an operative structure. This scheme, which remains valid if we include the alter-ego relation, is of interest for recognising the importance of the operative structure. This structure can belong to the subject, in the case of idealism, of intellectualism and of some cognitivist currents, to the object in the case of empiricism, to both with constructivism, or to their relationship with structuralism. We could add to it to the alter-ego relationship in the case illustrated by dialogism. It was amply developed in the 1961 edition, finding a significant impact in the models developed by the Schools of Aix and Geneva. Let me now try to show how this tri- or quadripartite pattern was developed and enriched in the work of Moscovici.

I will not discuss here the contribution corresponding to what Moscovici (1992) called "the recent turn in the theory of social representations" consisting in the articulation of these latter with language and communication through conversation and media. This entry in the field of language which he traces back to 1984 was however largely present in the first book. As was present the attention given to communication systems studied about the media. From this point of view, the subsequent writings of Moscovici appear as the extension of the field of analysis of communication systems, completing the media support with the conversational support. But given that this perspective is widely disseminated, known, even prevalent, and is represented in our current encounter, I prefer to focus on one line of reflection which received less attention despite its innovative nature: the line which focuses on knowledge itself. A special form of knowledge, that of common sense, in the approach and the rehabilitation for which Moscovici played a pioneering role.

The importance of this return on knowledge is for me directly related to an issue of concern. Whether the "conversational turn" taken in recent theorisations does not boil down to externalise the properties of the representation. These properties are related to the properties of language and we lose sight of what they may owe to the social belonging of speakers and to their inscription in social relations as well as to their subjective implication. Implication to which Moscovici is sensitive when he rises against a hierarchical vision of the relations to the world and rejects the "great divide" established between their archaic and modern patterns. His position draws, he says, on a "subjective aspect first. I think that the relation to the world and to knowledge, as the relation to work of art and to technique is always a carnal, physical relation... I do not think that we think the objects. If it is the case, somehow we find ourselves originally in the object" (2002a, p. 36). As I will argue further, this physical union where we find signs of his acquaintance with Phenomenology, will affect the way of conceiving the role of social representations in the ideational processes.

Moreover, with the new emphasis on language, a displacement of perspective is observed on the relationship between communication and representation. This perspective turns away from the way communication affects the form, processes and contents of representations to examine how these latters contribute to social exchange. Certainly, this perspective comes to further develop an analysis aspect mentioned since the origin of the model, namely the orientation function of communications. But this perspective elicits an analysis shift from the conceptual level to the phenomenal level and gives a special status to representations. Thus in the study of representations carried out in 1994 from a pragmatic point of view, representations become the context of mutual understanding and of the interpretation of messages exchanged that are not limited to the clarification of their semantic content. Therefore they are applied to the conversational exchange and become

"floating" ideas unrelated to the concrete contexts of people's life and exchanges. While this new theorisation is of patent fecundity -we shall see why-, it should not be adopted at the cost of the exclusion of a threefold analysis: the analysis of the nature of the object which the communication deals with, the analysis of the impact of the social and subjective framework of the representation, and the analysis of the effect of the formation processes of representations on their contents.

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND FORMS OF THOUGHT

There is no point to return to the critics, too well known and often repeated, made to the theories of social cognition. What is important here is to emphasise the propositions weighed against these critics. Namely, a holistic approach addressing the systems that govern the combination of cognitive operations in the guise of "forms of thought". These forms have to do with action and practices, in the framework of social and communicational relations about objects of social relevance. Indeed, the central concern of SRt which regards the functioning of thinking is not to be demonstrated anymore. This concern emerges from several texts that complement the elaborations on common sense and its relation to science. First amongst these texts are all the analyses proposed in the first edition under the title "observations on the cognitive aspects of social representation" and revived in condensed form in the second edition about the logic of social thinking described as "natural thinking". Then there are all the texts in which specific forms of thinking are analysed: "informative thinking" vs. "representative thinking" (1984), "The new magical thinking" (1992), "stigmatic thinking and symbolic thinking" (2002), "the prelogical mentality of primitives and the prelogical mentality of the civilized" (1994), etc.

In this series of texts, one can observe a shift in the approach to knowledge. In the first edition, the focus was on the social determinants of the modalities of common sense knowledge and of the transformation of scientific knowledge. An initial analysis focused on the factors of social situation which have an impact on the processes of elaboration of judgments as to the object of representation: the discrepancy and dispersion of the information related to the social position of individuals; the pressures to inference which respond to the constraints of the social exchange where opinions are transmitted and become fixed; the thematic focus of the intellectual interests expressing social memberships. A second analysis referred to the production processes of representations, objectification and anchoring, processes on which I shall return and which reflect a dialectic movement associating the influence of the social and the construction of the social. A third analysis revealed the style in which a form of thinking characterised by its oral medium and its function of ideas in communication, manifests itself. This style is marked by spontaneous formalism, causal dualism, conclusion pre-eminence, plurality of types of reasoning, cognitive polyphasia, and operation of regulatory principles: analogy and compensation. Only some of these proposals have received attention in the research carried out in the field of social representations. Yet Moscovici had enriched his analysis on a logic plan, opening new projects of work on different forms of thinking. This is the case, for example, with processes such as pressure to the reference, nomination, transformation processes (personification, figuration, ontologisation), through which representations become "copies" of a state of knowledge and reality. It is this fertile ground that laid resources for the logical and rhetorical analysis of social representations related to objects mobilising alternative or conflicting positions.

Also present in the first edition was a central and lateral reflection on the social determinations of the representation referring to the conditionings that result from socio-economical factors and to the correspondence, homology, between a particular field of representation and a system of intellectual orientation. It is to this dynamic that was related the expressive character of representations. Along with these considerations was opened a questioning on the affective and

emotional foundations of the formal aspects or of the contents of the representation. Questionings which will later lead to developments on beliefs in their relation to the emotional investment of social and cultural belongings and to the functioning of the masses (1985, 1988) and to a rereading of the modalities of membership to representative systems and of the role of values.

The second edition of Psychoanalysis retrieves some of these developments with a different emphasis. While the notion of social representation is addressed at the beginning of the book with the aim to return to a forgotten tradition and with a perspective of conceptual construction, we see how the reference to social determination disappears in favour of a reflection on the issues of social transmission and scientific vulgarisation. Formation processes are treated differently and less broadly while natural logic keeps all its importance and while linguistic aspects benefit from an in-depth attention.

One can see in these differences, as in those which will appear in later writings, the result of a double movement. On one hand, an in-depth critique of models inspired by behaviourism or those prevailing then in the social sciences. This leads to question a vision considering social actors and the "thinking society" as automatons passively submitted to the reproduction of ideological prescriptions or to the domination of fossilised structures. In this Moscovici innovated long before other incumbents of the social sciences rallied behind this criticism in the late 80s (Jodelet, 2009). On the other hand, a transformation of the relation to the scientific and intellectual context in reference to which Moscovici's perspective evolves, Moscovici himself always stressing that his theory is a theory "in the making". In his first book, he broke new ground in relation to an already established context, both in the social sciences and in social psychology or genetics. As a result he referred to this context either in the form of a critical analysis aimed at an overcoming, or in the form of parallels likely to guide or enrich the reflection.

In the 1976 publication, Moscovici's propositions had already gained widespread acceptance and opened important research projects, particularly in the field of scientific vulgarisation. He could not fail to take this into account. Moreover, debates were on the increase led by scientific currents sharing with him a critique of the methodological behaviourism both in the philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and in linguistics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, the theories of action. He could not ignore them. What is more, he found in their propositions echoes corroborating his initial intuitions. He could only turn this to the advantageand enrichment of his theory.

This situation gave rise to a shift in Moscovici's thinking which subordinated the cognitive aspects of the social representation to the communication processes and linguistic processes. The representation was not indexed anymore to a social context, understood in the sense of social and material conditions of knowledge production, to become a mediatory agent and producer of social relations. In this evolution, the originality was to confer on the representations a dynamic force, a role in the communication. The latter was at the source of the formation of social representations under a twofold relation: representations were formed in communication and they had the purpose to direct communications. Henceforth, communication becomes the product of the representations which have a pragmatic power. Becoming a condition of communication, they will provide it with the resources that refer as much to different strata of knowledge as to the value systems which form the culture of groups.

VALUE AS OPERATOR OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

An important social dimension appeared, from the beginning, in the modelling of knowledge: the value and system of norms associated with it. If the two processes of formation of social representations give to values and norms a special highlight, the reference to them goes through the whole work of Moscovici, corresponding to an ethical concern which has always inspired him. This

interest is in connection with the fact of having been raised in a "culture of death" against which he rebels, seeking in science and technology the possibility of a response and in nature an "anchor in life" (2002, p. 29-30). This ethical concern finds a new life in the recent writings dedicated to victimisation (2005) and to the fate reserved for Gypsies (2009). This concern corresponds to a personal experience which renders sensitive to how the life of ideas is inflected by the set of values as evidenced by the formation processes of social representations.

To take full measure of this set, we must also refer to the first edition of Psychoanalysis where objectification and above all anchoring are differently accentuated as compared with the second edition. In this edition, the importance of the role of acquired knowledge is emphasised with the reference to the phenomenon of "the familiarisation of the strange." In the first edition, values underpin the work of selection, schematisation of objectification and the construction of meanings in the anchorage. We refer to the notion of "normative meta-system" about them, but rather than norm, the obliged referent of the studies in social cognition, it is indeed the enactment of an ethic of life which is targeted through the moral taboo regarding sexuality. And what does this ethic produce? First a selective construction of knowledge. Second a distinction between knowledge and meaning which is crucial for a psychosociology of knowledge. This distinction is evident with the treatment of anchoring in the first edition, thanks to the introduction of a "principle of meaning", less developed in the second edition, but above all less obvious for the readers, probably because of the difficulty of its analysis. And in fact, a few works explored the axiological dimension of representations.

This distinction knowledge/meaning is not only fundamental to a theoretical advance, but it also puts us in the presence of a major contribution of Moscovici to the theory of meaning. It is the value which makes the sense of the things of life. It is also the value which allows to make a judgment on the validity of knowledge. In this aspect he anticipated a whole current of epistemology, "the epistemology of virtues," which meets the Aristotelian "phronesis" and bases the reliability of knowledge on the unity of intellectual and moral virtues (Dutant & Engel, 2005). He joins them when he gauges from the standpoint of a historico-ethical perspective, how cognitive social psychology and the social psychology of social representations account for the phenomena of exclusion of a discriminated minority by a discriminant majority (2009). The shortcomings of the cognitive models of prejudice, which focus on abstract thinking and rational coherence of the social world, are opposed to the resources offered by the theory of social representations. Exploring the "currents of knowledge and of formulas of common sense" that crystallise, around a figurative nucleus, the images, notions and judgments of a group or of a society concerning a minority, the theory of social representations helps to understand its generation across time and its similarity across social spaces (op.cit. pp. 656-658). In the text I quote, Moscovici makes important remarks to objectification and anchoring. In this manner he shows that the theme of wandering that goes back to over two thousand years, will serve as a basis for a series of thêmatas constituting the figurative nucleus of the discriminated minorities, including that of the nomadic and outlaws gypsies. This image will serve as a backdrop, an anchor for the way the image of the "bohemian" was developed in the Paris of the nineteenth century.

THE POWER OF IMAGES

This revisit of the role of images, affirmed in innovative ways as of 1961, confirms the continuity of Moscovici's thinking. This emphasis given to the figurative, imaged, character of common sense thinking did not elicit the responses it deserves in research on social representations. The transition through the image, which ensures the concrete character of the representation, guarantees the applicability of knowledge that is developed by the practical aspects of the processes of objectification and anchoring. This transition is also the means to ensure the permanence of

representations in the collective memory, their accumulation in layers referring to times more or less ancient and their relation to the symbolic and imaginary. The image comes also in support of an approach which is "aestheticising" and creative of representations. It reveals its character of "poiesis".

I lack the time and I admit the means to show how Moscovici includes images in the dynamics of thinking. Here I would like simply to make a connection between his perspective and that of phenomenology which we can find in authors such as Merleau-Ponty or Anna Arendt. Based on the experience endured within a given social condition and on the body through which is established the relation to the world and others, thinking does not always have a clear formulation. For this it needs to go through verbal expression in the intersubjective exchange. But before, thinking remains in this vague, uncertain state, akin to limbo and whose image occupies the space: "How many things still float in the limbo of human thinking," said Flaubert. While we could here build a bridge with Moscovici's reflections on the unconscious (1993), we could also refer to the idea that he takes from Weber: the idea of the representations that float in people's heads (1992, p. 166). These floating representations serve as a context for the meanings that circulate and are interpreted in the intersubjective, conversational exchange. These representations have a conceptual or iconic character and Moscovici stresses the point that the iconic aspect of representations precedes and establishes their conceptual aspect, speaking of "figurative texture" of the context of meanings. Couldn't we make a connection between this conception and what is put forward about the value that establishes the sense that we give to the world and structures how we construct it in knowledge?

CONCLUSION

The rough sketch of the marking-out attempted here will, I hope, motivate the deepening of the project opened by the consideration of the correspondences existing between all branches of Moscovici's work. The transition through the psychosociology of knowledge would be a good key to it. In the epistemological models that account for the validity of knowledge, two views conflict: "foundationalism" and "coherentism". For the first conception, knowledge is based on basic principles. For the second, the different items of knowledge support each other. Two metaphors emphasise these views: the metaphor of the pyramid and the metaphor of the raft (Sosa, 2005). The metaphor of the pyramid leads to regress by stages towards the principles which, by justifying our beliefs about the world, ensure their veracity. The metaphor of the raft, proposed by Neurath and revisited by Quine, sees the corpus of knowledge as a raft floating unattached which is rebuilt at sea. All its parts are interdependent and any modification of either part must be made afloat, leaning upon others. The guarantees of knowledges lay in their consistency with the overall system.

In the face of a work as articulated in its diversity as the one we celebrate here, in the face of a theoretical enterprise that wants itself always in the making, it seems to me that we could apply to it the metaphor of the raft. First, because the metaphor of the pyramid is static and hierarchical, two modes of thinking to which Moscovici remains profoundly stranger, and even allergic. But above all because the raft embodies the movement of the floods of life and the advances of knowledge, advances constantly renewed, always fiddled against the "culture of death".

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