Revisiting *Gender Identities and Education*: Notes for a Social Psychology of Resistant Identities in Modern Cultures

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In this paper I offer a review and a reflection on *Gender Identities and Education: The Impact of Starting School* (Lloyd and Duveen, 1992) as a means of examining the detail and insights of Gerard Duveen’s contribution to the study of identity. What this study highlights is the contextual, imposed, inter-subjective and collaborative nature of identity, the relationship between re-presentation, culture and identity, and the dynamic, resistant and transformative character of identity production. I give detailed empirical examples of the genesis of representations of gender and gendered identities through a discussion of the interconnections between microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis. This leads onto a consideration of representations ‘that other’ more generally and the importance of including the social and material within the methodology of identity projects. As such, I argue, we can see the work of Duveen and his colleagues as valuable for a theory and a method of research of resistant identities in modern cultures, and thereby develop a social psychology properly equipped to research current social relations, and properly engaged with contemporary experiences of identity.

A defining feature of modern life is the changing form of social and cultural identities (Giddens, 1991). The transformation of traditional, localised communities into transient multicultures (Howarth, 2001), the breakdown of collective representations into social representations (Moscovici, 1984) and the impact of globalisation, migration, urbanisation and communication technologies have all had a transformative effect on the ways in which we talk about, experience and research identity. Social scientists exploring these changes in modern life often turn to established theories of identity, social groups and culture. Most obviously Social Psychologists turn to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1982) and
consider what revisions are needed to keep our theories up-to-date (scholarly examples include Chryssochoou, 2004; Reicher, 2004; Billig, 2002). Here I introduce a different tack.

I suggest that it is increasingly apparent that a social psychology properly equipped to research current social relations and to properly engage with contemporary experiences of identity needs a more explicit focus on *doing* culture and *doing* identity; that is, we need to promote studies of identity that challenge essentialising or one-dimensional accounts of social categorisation (Howarth, 2009). In preparing for this special issue and re-reading the work of Gerard Duveen I have been struck by the ways in which his work speaks to such issues of our time: the impact of power and social inequalities on identity, the institutionalisation of identities, the connections between culture and identity, and the possibilities for resistance and social change. These are central concerns for a current social psychology of modern culture – one able to account for the transformation of culture, the development of intersectional and multicultural identities and the very political essence of the psychological. These are not exactly Gerard’s questions; they are my own. And yet, in reflecting on Gerard’s work and reading the many contributions for the special issue, I am all the more convinced that his work offers essential insights for us, both in terms of theory and methods, which extend far beyond the parameters of his own studies. Hence, as a reminder for some and as an introduction for others, I hope that a review of his work, and some points of reflection will be of value for scholars and students of modern identity in a broad range of contexts.

In a range of laboratory and naturalistic studies Gerard and his colleagues Barbara Lloyd, Wolfgang Wagner, Charis Psaltis and others examine the development, communication and consequence of social knowledge in adults and young children, and the importance of such for social identities (for example, Duveen and Lloyd, 1986, 1990; Wagner, Duveen, Verma, Temel, 2000; Psaltis and Duveen, 2006). It is in the detail of these studies that we find Gerard’s acute precision and real insight, and so rather than a general review of his extensive writings (on belief, social groups, cultural encounters, social influence, mental illness, moral reasoning and problem solving) I shall focus on one work: his study with Barbara Lloyd *Gender Identities and Education: The Impact of Starting School* (1992) as this contains the central dynamics of much of his thought and writings. What this study highlights is the contextual, imposed, inter-subjective
and collaborative nature of identity, the relationship between re-presentation, culture and identity, and the dynamic, resistant and transformative character of identity production1.

These insights flow from their theoretical perspective on identity, development and culture (informed by Piaget, Vygotsky, Moscovici and Bruner) but also from their careful ethnographic approach, influenced by Barbara Lloyd’s research with anthropologists (Lloyd, this issue). Their methods have important lessons for identity studies: a detailed qualitative analysis of the meanings, categories and practices that participants themselves employ, in everyday interaction and exchange, is essential for a comprehensive account of the connections between culture and identity, as others advocate (e.g., Connolly, 2000). In particular, they look at the ways in which both adults and children ‘do’ gender in a variety of different institutionalised contexts and social encounters (Lloyd and Duveen, 1992). What is important is that they examine both material practices and social psychological phenomena:

- social categories evoked in verbal exchanges, for example a teacher saying ‘Let’s see if the boys are ready or the girls are ready’
- material culture – such as dolls, tutus and toy guns. Objects can communicate different meanings depending on their use – such as a scarf used by girls dressing up a bride or used by boys to symbolise the cape of a superhero.
- activities which are identified as masculine or feminine, such as boys playing trains or girls tidying up.
- behavioural styles – assertive, noisy behaviour is generally read as masculine, while quiet, compliant play is read as feminine.
- social spaces – such as the playground being a place for ‘boys to let off steam’ and the home-corner for girls’ play.

Thus Lloyd and Duveen examine knowledge, norms and expectations about gender through a range of diverse social practices. They argue that “one function of social representations is to transform the arbitrary into the consensual, thereby facilitating communication” (p. 31), and so they examine the ongoing production and maintenance of representations of gender that attach

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1 Here I have used a hyphen when discussing the process or act of social re-presentation to highlight the fact that representations are constantly re-interpreted, re-thought, re-presented, “always in the making” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 167). When I use the term representation I refer to the social psychological entity – such as representations of gender, of nationality, of race.

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asymmetrical values onto arbitrary objects, spaces or forms of speech and behaviour. Lloyd and Duveen are interested in the numerous ways society transmits values, ideas and practices relating to gender, what girls and boys ‘should’ be like, who should and should not play with particular toys and how they should play – and so how children, parents and teachers convey, extend or challenge ideological assumptions about gender. In this way, they reveal the production of gender and the ‘doing’ of both culture and identity.

Their study also tells us about the social psychology of communication (Howarth, 2010a). We often think about communication in terms of verbal communication, and studies using Social Representations Theory have similarly concentrated on (verbal and written) discourse as ‘thinking through the mouth’ (Marková, 2003). What Lloyd and Duveen highlight is that communication and so re-presentation and identity are so much more complex than this. Material culture, social practices, embodiment and social spaces are all equally important aspects of the communication and transformation of meaning and the ‘doing’ of identity. Hence we need to examine language and action as equally important aspects of communication (Jovchelovitch, 2007).

At the heart of Lloyd and Duveen’s research, and at the heart of SRT generally, is an interest in transformation and resistance (Howarth, 2006a). Moscovici was primarily concerned with the transformation of knowledge from science to the everyday, across different social groups in society and across different communicative genres (Duveen, 2008). Following this tradition, Duveen and Lloyd are interested in the genesis of representations – at the level of society in general (sociogenesis), at the interface between the individual and the social (ontogenesis) and in the particular interactions between individuals (microgenesis). In fact when one looks at any social exchange, we see that these levels are intertwined (Gillespie and Cornish, this issue). However, in order to illustrate Duveen’s contribution to our understanding of the complex relationship between re-presentation, culture and identity, it is analytically useful to apply these categories – as I do below.
THE MICROGENESIS OF REPRESENTATIONS IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE

Barbara Lloyd and Gerard Duveen (1992) start their book on *Gender Identities and Education: The Impact of Starting School* with this extract from their field-notes:

9.29 am Seth selects the orange/pink nightie from the dressing up rack, though he has a lot of trouble getting it on before he finally succeeds. Then he tries to put the white tutu number on top. More difficulty. Great concentration. No-one really takes much notice. One girl, Charity, does come up to him and says ‘It’s not for you Seth’. He looks bemused, but goes back to struggling with the white tutu. After a great deal of trouble he takes it to the teacher and asks her to put it on him. ‘Oh no Seth, that’s the smallest dress we’ve got, you won’t fit into it. Let’s look for something else. [The teacher suggests.] Seth chooses a skirt. Teacher says ‘That’s nice’ and also encourages him to put on a waistcoat.

Here we can examine the microgenesis of representations in this encounter – that is the evolution of representations in the verbal and nonverbal exchanges between different social parties. For many the explicit examples of communication here would be what Charity and the teacher explicitly say to Seth. But we can see that the meaning of the situation is contained in conflicting meanings that particular material objects invite (the tutu, the skirt and the waistcoat) – or invite when worn by a little boy. Moscovici has said (1990, p. 166):

There is something marvellously ethereal about representations, since they can be transmitted from one individual to another through non-material means. At the same time they are concrete, one objectified in institutions, rituals and works of art.

Here these representations are too ethereal for Seth. It seems as if he does not share these meanings – and so is bemused by Charity’s comments and does not fully understand the teacher’s suggestion they find something else, meaning we can assume something more suitable *for a boy*. Hence while his actions (struggling into the tutu) communicate certain meanings which are interpreted and communicated back to him by Charity and his teacher, he is yet to internalise their social representation of gender. Over the course of the first year at school,
however, we see that this changes and boys come to share, express and defend such normative gendered codes and expectations.

Reporting on Caroline Smith’s experimental study (Smith and Lloyd, 1978) Lloyd and Duveen also looked at the microgenesis of representations of gender in exchanges with very young babies (six months old). For example, in one study mothers played with an unfamiliar baby for 10 minutes. The baby was either presented as ‘Jane’ in a ruffled dress or as ‘John’ in blue baby-grow. Half of the time the baby’s apparent gender was congruent with their actual sex, and half the time they were incongruent. What they found was that regardless of the baby’s actual sex “when dress and name signified maleness women offered verbal encouragement to the infant’s gross motor activity and responded themselves with further motor stimulation. Yet the same gross motor activity of the same infant whose dress and name signified femaleness elicited soothing and calming” (ibid, p. 34). Hence, while there was no difference between the girls and boys’ actual play and behaviour, this was read very differently by the mothers depending on the baby’s name and clothes. What we see here is the microgenesis of a representation – a social representation of gender seen in the mothers’ responses that is also widely shared in society, but one that has yet to be communicated effectively to the baby. The baby’s identity remains ascribed or ‘extended’ (imposed on them by significant others). As we see below, however, over time these representations are “progressively internalised by children” (Duveen, 2001, p. 260) as they become independent social actors within gender cultures.

THE ONTOGENESIS OF REPRESENTATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTITY

As children get older, we see that they are much more receptive to the social meanings around them (Hofstede, 1984). As we saw above, six month old girls and boys show no differences in behavioural style (such as gross motor activity). However Duveen and Lloyd found that from a very young age (from 13 months) toddlers start to modify gendered behaviour in line with parental expectations. For instance, little girls become aware that mothers may interpret gross motor movements as distress as mothers will often try to soothe them, and so little girls may quieten when they can see their mothers watching them (though appear happy and active when
they do not realise they are being observed through a one-way mirror). As gross motor activity in boys is more likely to be interpreted as enjoyment and so encouraged by parents, boys are not so inclined to change their behaviour in the known presence of their mother. Hence, from this young age representations of gender and expectations of what is appropriate gendered behaviour come to mould identities. Lloyd and Duveen (1992) describe social representations as ‘scaffolding’ in children’s efforts to build an understanding of their social worlds and so to construct and communicate a gendered identity (Bruner and Haste 1987). This points to the ontogenesis of representations, the beginnings of the internalization of gender and so the development of specific gendered identities.

Lloyd and Duveen show that “children are born into a particular society and become competent, functioning individuals with particular social identities to the extent that they reconstruct for themselves the social representations of the significant groups of their society” (1992, p. 27). They again demonstrate the development of gendered identities in a third study with 120 children aged 1½ to 3½ years. Here pairs of either same sex children or a boy and a girl were videoed playing with a range of toys including those which would generally be seen as boys’ toys (hammer, garage, gun) or girls’ toys (doll, tea set, ironing board). Analyses of the toy choices showed a strong and asymmetrical pattern (Duveen, 2001). Unsurprisingly boy/boy pairs played more with the “boys’ toys” than did girl/girl pairs. This pattern increases with age (particularly from 2½ years) as children develop a sophisticated understanding of gender markings. What is interesting is that this pattern is explained purely by the boys’ choices: girls do not discriminate between the toys in this way as “girls express a social gender identity by not marking a difference” (Lloyd and Duveen, 1992, p. 43). As Moscovici (1990) has explained with reference to this particular study:

What is transmitted to them is the representation of a hierarchy, in a society where boys have a positive identity and girls rather a negative identity. In effect, to choose the toys attributed to one’s own gender is to affirm a distinction and a superiority, whereas not to choose them amounts to denying this distinction but recognising through this denial one’s own inferiority (pp. 173-174).

Hence we see that representations are not neutral; they pervade and defend particular societal arrangements and interests and so are inseparable from relations of power, privilege and
prejudice. We return to these points below. Finally, in a fourth study Lloyd and Duveen examined children’s understanding of gender in various sorting tasks using cards with pictures of men and women or toys to be assigned as “girls’ toys” or “boy’s toys”. Here they are asked about gender in the abstract, as gender markings were not embedded in the context of their play as in the previous studies. All children found this very difficult, with the 4 year olds having the most success. What is interesting is that we have seen that children understand social conventions about gender from a surprisingly young age (13 months) and use this understanding to modify their behaviour in the known presence of others. We have seen that from 2½ years they easily conform to or resist expectations about gender in practical social exchanges. And these general patterns are predictable with the boys having most to gain from conforming to gendered expectations and the girls the most to lose. Hence “girls are the social actors most often prepared to violate the relations of power evoked by consensual representations of gender” (Lloyd and Duveen, 1992, p. 182). We can say that girls and boys have some understanding of social representations of gender and they are expressing their own knowledge and identity in relation to gender – primarily through play and material culture. However, in contrast they cannot make use of this knowledge in the abstract. While they have internalised gender systems, this remains a very applied or concrete knowledge, sustained in communicative practices but not (yet) accessible in discussion or reflection. Hence “social gender identities exert a greater influence on children’s practical activity than on their theoretical understanding of gender” (Lloyd and Duveen, 1992, p. 175).

THE SOCIOGENESIS OF REPRESENTATIONS IN INSTITUTIONALISED PRACTICES

Moscovici (2000) sought to answer this question: “how do people construct their social reality?” He continues:

While the actor sees the problem, the observer does not see the whole historical solution. Marx was well aware of this dilemma when he wrote: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please: they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx, 1852/1968, p. 97).

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What Lloyd and Duveen examine is ‘how do people construct gendered realities’ – and following Moscovici (and Marx), highlight the role of historical narratives, institutionalisation and collective reification in processes of social categorisation. In their schools study, for example, they found that expectations and conventions about gender were embedded in ideologies about gender, sexuality and child-centred education. These were worked into the running of the school and the structure of classroom activities. Many of the stories teachers read to the children, “preserve existing social conventions, marking gender-appropriate material culture, activity and behavioural style” (p. 67). In one story, for example, a little girl could not deal with a burst water pipe and needed her Daddy to turn off the water supply. The stories about boys in contrast were much more likely to position them as ‘in charge’ of the situation and not reliant on the help of others. Hence in ways that appear both concrete and ethereal (to different children, in different interactions), conventional gendered identities are transmitted to the children and so constitute a local gender culture.

However what is really significant is that while representations of gender were institutionalised across the different schools in the study, this was done quite differently. As Moscovici (2000) has argued, schools operate as “communication institutions” (p. 277). Furthermore different local gender cultures emerged in the different classrooms within the schools. Very generally these differences can be seen to stem from a nature/nurture opposition, as some teachers present a view of ‘sex differences’ as natural, while others develop an account of ‘gender differences’ as open to social influences (Duveen, 2001). For instance, one teacher explicitly encouraged gender appropriate activities much more so than others in the same school, asking girls to tidy up, while suggesting the boys play trains, or even reprimanding a boy for pretending to cook. In other classes, representations of gender were much more implicit, with very little being actually said about gender, but a great deal being communicated subtly as we saw with Seth’s teacher above. Hence gender emerges as a significant marker of social activities, material practices and appropriate behaviours in different ways in different relationships and contexts.

Gender is a contractual, non-negotiable identity: we cannot opt out of social practices that construct, defend and sometimes challenge representations of gender. However, there are many
ways of negotiating gendered practices and many ways of presenting a gendered identity. This is another insight of Lloyd and Duveen – they distinguish between ‘high’ (conformist) and ‘low’ (non-conformist) gendered identities as part of a continuum – where children’s positions may change, being in part a function of the particular relationship, exchange and context that they are in.

Linking the sociogenetic, ontogenetic and microgenetic levels of gendered representations Joffe (2007) has argued that it is interpersonal communication as well as “broader communication systems, such as the mass media” that “relay ongoing representations concerning certain identities, … such as having been represented as female – the ongoing babble in the environment constantly constructs and reconstructs one” (p. 206). In focussing on this ‘babble’ – the dominant, historical narratives of identity – we examine the sociogenesis of representations in social life. This is where representations appear at their most prevalent – pervading social institutions, cultural arrangements, the media, advertising campaigns, political discourses and so forth. This is also where we see how different representations are reified and prioritised over others, how some representations (and the social groups and social identities to which they relate) are marginalised and excluded from mainstream systems of discourse, and how the process of re-presentation supports ideological systems (Augoustinos, 2001). Moloney’s (2007) research into the role of the media in sustaining ideologies of prejudice demonstrates this clearly, as refugees, for example, enter a society saturated with the “ideas, beliefs and values that position them in the social matrix of their new country” (p. 64). Hence networks of social representations support a priori hierarchies of knowledge, support discourses of difference, privilege and power and so restrict the development of identity – across gender and representations of others more generally.

FROM GENDERED DIFFERENCE TO REPRESENTATIONS OF ‘OTHERS’

Just as all social exchange involves presenting the self, it also involves the other – who we communicate with, or about, our re-presentation of ‘them’ and their representations of ‘us’, as Augoustinos and Riggs (2007) discuss with reference to white identities in Australia. Hence representations of others impact on the process and content of identity as re-presentation rests on this dialectic of connection and disconnection – as we build and resist commonalities and
differences across social categories (Augoustinos, 2001). As a consequence social representations are marked by dialogicality, which Marková (2007) has defined as “the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of, or in opposition to, otherness” (p. 231). Indeed, without otherness there would be no need to communicate; and if we had nothing in common there would be no possibility of communication (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The connections between the social psychological processes of re-presentation and identification are maintained through social exchange – we draw on, debate, defend and contest whole systems of categorising that relate to how we position ourselves, how we position others and how they position us (Tajfel, 1978), as we saw above with reference to gendered cultures in schools. In taking on the representations of our social groups – we become part of the group and so develop bonds with others and a sense of difference to ‘others’. As Fay has eloquently explained, developing an identity involves:

...learning to read the culture’s basic text and making it one’s own. ... A culture penetrates its individual members mentally (so that they possess as a certain mind-set), physically (so that they possess certain basic bodily dispositions), and socially (so that they relate to one another in certain characteristic ways).


But Fay goes on to say that it is often much more complex than this – as there is not one mind-set, set of physical dispositions or social characteristics but many – with a complex array of power differentials that correspond to different ways of knowing, doing and relating. Thus, as Fay points out, such a simple definition of culture hides the diversity of human communities, histories of struggle and the possibilities for change and transformation. What is apparent in Lloyd and Duveen’s studies is that microgenesis and ontogenesis do not happen in isolation from other representations and other identities set within social structures and social practices. Thus the psychological is deeply embedded within the social. This obviously extends beyond representations of gender and draws in representations of sexuality, class, nationality, ‘race’, neighbourhood and so on (Howarth, 2010b; Sammut, this issue).

Hence we see that it is in social interactions and activities, in interacting with others in a practical way, that representations and identities become meaningful, debated, contested and transformed. However, as Lloyd and Duveen’s work clearly demonstrates, there are very real
limits to the (co)production of identity, particularly identities under threat (Breakwell, 1993). The material, historical and ideological nature of social categorisation means that these categories may be imposed on us as we are pulled into reified categories and so ascribed a particular identity (Althusser, 1970). As Fanon (1952) powerfully argues with reference to black identities: “it is not I who make a meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for me” (p. 134). This struggle over identity or the question ‘Identity in whose eyes?’ (Howarth, 2002a) has been pivotal in my own research on identity. For instance I have looked at young people’s efforts to develop and assert positive cultural identities (Howarth, 2002b) in the face of racialising representations institutionalised in school practices and dominant discourses (Howarth, 2006b). In being seen in a particular way, for example, as black, brown or mixed, pupils may be positioned as different, as other and, often, as outside of and hence excluded from the contexts of intellectual achievement and learning (Howarth, 2004). Hence there is a political struggle and a symbolic violence contained in the connection between representation and identity (Hall, 1997). Simultaneously, the psychological politics of identity is evident in and sustained by the material realities of social institutions, such as schools, and thus a comprehensive account of identity needs to focus on the interconnections between the ideological, social, material and psychological dimensions of identity.

NOTES FOR A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RESISTANT IDENTITIES

And “yet”, Duveen (1994) has argued, “the circulation of representations around the child does not lead to them being either simply impressed upon the child, or simply appropriated by the child, rather, their acquisition is an outcome of development” (p. 112). Identities are not merely imposed or ascribed through social exchange, as we saw above in girls’ subtle rejection of the hegemony of a strict bipolar opposition of the feminine and masculine: identities are also a matter of negotiation, connection, imagination and resistance (Duveen, 2001). As Moscovici (1984, p. 16) argues:

individuals and groups, far from being passive receptors, think for themselves, produce and ceaselessly communicate their own specific representations and solutions to the questions they set themselves … which have a decisive impact on their social relations, their choices.

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This means that there is room to debate, resist and potentially transform representations and practices that *other* and exclude (Batel and Castro, 2009; Gorgorió and de Abreu, 2009). As Deaux and Wiley (2007) have said with reference to migrant identities, these are “working spaces in which different groups can create quite different meaning systems” (p. 15). Representations and therefore the communities and identities which produce and/or contest them are always in a ‘process of becoming’ (Hall, 1997). Even in the face of negative representations of self, there are the possibilities of social creativity and social change as we find ways to co-construct more positive versions of self, community and culture (Howarth, 2010b).

This speaks to heart of Duveen’s work: resistance. Lloyd and Duveen’s study demonstrates that this occurs at both an individual and a cultural level: girls and boys take up and rework, re-interpret and re-present representations in a way that fits into and develops their sense of self; at a cultural level “each social group reconstitutes knowledge according to its own interests and concerns” (Duveen, 2008a, p. xii). Hence, while representations always stem from somewhere and bring with them connections to previous systems of knowing and identifying, they are always dynamic and open to be elaborated in new and challenging ways (Marková, 2000). I hope to have demonstrated this through an in-depth analysis of Lloyd and Duveen’s study of the development of gendered identities and gendered cultures. What they achieved is a vivid account of the research context (here, schools) as a site of the production of meaning where participants “actively and creatively use the tools of their culture to make meaning with others”, as Sullivan and McCarthy (2004, p. 295) put it. That is, Lloyd and Duveen use everyday settings (classrooms and playgrounds) to explore how teachers, children and parents ‘do’ identity, construct cultures and negotiate difference. Thus there is a tight fit between their theory and method.

Albeit in less detail, I have also referred to other studies that focus on other social identities and communities, such as white Australians (Augoustinos and Riggs, 2007), immigrants in the US (Deaux and Wiley, 2007), refugees and asylum seekers in Australia (Moloney, 2007), and black British and mixed-heritage children (Howarth, 2010b). There are more applications to other forms of identity contained within this special issue, such as folk-school identities (Andersén, this issue) and national identities (Sammut, this issue). As a whole these studies demonstrate that the ‘doing’ of identity parallels the discovery, elaboration and imposition of social representations of
different social groups in institutionalised practices. Thus identification and social re-presentation are intimately and materially connected in social encounters – as identities are collaborated and contextualised, embedded in historical narratives and material realities, but also present the possibilities for social and psychological change. Hence Lloyd and Duveen’s studies show how identity and therefore resistance always operates within and against social structures.

I began this paper with an invitation to look at the impact of changes in social and cultural life on modern identities. I argued that we need to highlight the very dynamic ways in which identities change as a function of their context and cultural-historical location, the shifting ways they are presented, defended and contested in social exchange, and the role of power on identity-work. Using the theory and method of Lloyd and Duveen as a starting point, and extending their perspective on identity beyond gender, at the very least we have some valuable notes for a social psychology of resistant identities in modern cultures. Gerard’s work, as we see in this study with Barbara Lloyd and in his other work, exemplifies a precise intellectual practice founded on a fine-tuned analysis of the interconnections between the everyday microgenesis of knowledge, the constraints and possibilities contained within the ontogenesis of identities and the centrality of sociogenesis in framing the dialectics of social stability and social change, or ideology and resistance. We are not in a position to finalise such a theory or method. What Gerard would encourage is more scholarship, more careful analysis and most importantly more engaged debate of these issues. And this is my ambition for the special issue as a whole, in memory of a dear friend and influential mentor.

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